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STATE OF WASHINGTON
Moore,

v.
CONFEDERATED BANDS AND
TRIBES OF THE YAKIMA
INDIAN NATION
1. SUMMARY:
§

Federal/Civil

Timely

Appeal is taken pursuant to 28 U. S.C.

1254(2) from theCA 9's decision holding that the Washington

statute which partially 'extends the State's criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian reservations violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. FACTS:

Public Law 83-280, enacted by Congress in

1953, provided for the immediate assumption of jurisdiction over
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-2Indians and Indian reservations by five States.

The act gave

other States, including Washington, the option of assuming
jurisdiction, provided certain conditions were first met.
Under the authority of this act, Washington in 1957 enacted
RCW § 37.12 which allowed a tribe or its governing body to adopt
a resolution petitioning the State to assume civil and criminal
jurisdiction over it, whereupon the governor was to issue a proclamation confirming the assumption.
In 1963 the legislature amended that statute in such a

r

manner as to provide for a division of jurisdiction over Indians
into two broad categories:

(1) jurisdiction assumed with the

consent of the affected tribes; and (2) jurisdiction assumed
without tribal consent.

In the first category the State assumed

jurisdiction over Indians and Indian reservations to the same
extent that it exercised civil and criminal jurisdiction elsewhere
in the State.

In the second category Washington assumed juris-

diction to the fullest extent permissible with respect to land
within a reservation held in fee (i.e., not tribal lands and not
held in trust or subject to a restriction against alienation.)
As for non-fee lands within a reservation occupied by a tribe
that had not consented, the State assumed jurisdiction only in
eight subject-matter categories:

compulsory school attendance,

public assistance, domestic relations, mental illness, juvenile
delinquency, adoption proceedings, dependent children, and
operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets and highways.
The non-consenting tribes were left free to seek and obtain a

-3complete assumption of state jurisdiction by petition.

This

statute thus results in what it referred to as a "checkerboard"
assumption of jurisdiction.
following respects:

1)

The assumption is partial in the

less than all of the reservations with-

in the State may consent to the State's jurisdiction; 2) within

a reservation that has not consented, the State's full assumption of jurisdiction may apply to only some of the geographic
territory; and 3) within the non-fee lands of a non-consenting
reservation the assumption of subject matter jurisdiction is
only partial.
The Yakimas, who have never petitioned for the State's
assumption of full jurisdiction over them, are located within a
reservation in Yakima County.

The reserv<tion has approximately

1,400,000 acres, of which all but approximately 270,000 are l1eld
in trust or restricted status by the United States.

Out of the

total reservation population of about 25,000, only 3,000 are
members of the Yakima Indian Nation.

Within the reservation are

two essentially non-Indian towns, Wapato and Toppenish, whose
land is

a~ost

entirely owned in fee.

The Yakimas brought a declaratory judgment action in the
DC, seeking a declaration that Washington's assumption and
exercise of jurisdiction over them and their reservation was
invalid on both constitutional and statutory grounds.

They con-

tended that RCW § 37.12 violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
Article XXVI of the Washington Constitution, and Public Law

83-280; in the alternative they sought a declaration that the

-4jurisdiction assumed and exercised by the State was nonexclusive and concurrent with federal and tribal jurisdiction.
The DC, after conducting a trial on the questions, dismissed
the complaint, finding that the statute violated neither the
state nor federal constitutions nor Public Law 83-280.

He also

found that state jurisdiction was exclusive rather than concurrent.
On appeal, after a panel of the CA 9 had heard argument,
the case was en banced for a determination of whether Public
Law 83-280 authorized Washington to assume partial

ju~isdiction.

The majority of the court, in an opinion by Judge Sneed, concluded that the court's prior decision in Quinault Tribe of Indians
v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 644 (CA 9 1966), supported the State's
argument that partial assumption was permissible under PL 83-280
and further concluded that the decision was correctly decided
and should be adhered to.

The dissenting opinion, writ.ten by

Judge Hufstedler, was of the view that PL 83-280 did not permit
the partial geographic and subject matter assumption that the
Washington statute prescribed.

The case was then remanded to

the panel for consideration of the remaining issues.
On remand the panel held that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause.

Focusing on the classification based

on the status of title to the land upon which an alleged criminal offense occurs, the court found no rational basis supporting it.

t ·

TheCA 9 said that the State's interest in enforcing

.

criminal law is no less fundamental or overriding on non-fee

-5lands than on fee lands and that no showing had been made that
the happenstance of title holding is related in any way to the
need by the land occupants for law enforcement.

The court con-

cluded that this checkerboard jurisdictional structure based on
a selection by land title was the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause.

Finding

that the invalid portion of the statute could not be severed from
the rest, the court struck down the entire statute.
3. CONTENTIONS:

The State argues that there is a rational

basis for its checkerboard assumption scheme in that the
legislature sought to apply the law equally to all citizens
while preserving a maximum of tribal self-government.

It con-

tends that the legislature merely recogni?.ed the reality of land
ownership patterns within reservations and decided to treat
non-Indian (or fee) lands just as if they were located outside
the reservation, while treating the remaining lands as the real
reservation.

In connection with these truly Indian lands, the

legislature gave the tribes a choice: they could either have full
state jurisdiction by petitioning the governor or they could keep
the lands subject to federal and tribal control, with the
exception of certain subject-matter areas vital to the State.
The eight enumerated categories were ones in which the legislature determined that the State had a fundamental concern for the
welfare of its people.

The State contends that in adopting this

checkerboard scheme the legislature recognized the strong
historical and cultural link between the concept of tribal

-6self-government and Indian land ownership and thus did not act
arbitrarily or irrationally.
In response the Yakimas point out that the practical
impact of theCA 9's decision is to relieve the State of a law
enforcement function that it has shown itself to be unwilling
or unable to carry out and to provide the Yakima Nation and the
federal government with the opportunity to provide adequate law
and order on the reservation.

They contend that the justifica-

tion for the statute that the State now asserts was not sugn~

gested in the courts below and that in any case it does provide
A

a rational basis for the drawing of distinctions based on land
title within the reservation.

Contending that the decision

below is clearly correct and that it will be limited in its
effect, they urge the Court to summarily affirm.
4. DISCUSSION:

The decision below seems sufficiently

questionable to warrant plenary consideration.

In light of the

State's argument concerning the reasons that the legislature
adopted the checkerboard scheme, I find it difficult to conclude

-----------

that the distinctions drawn were totally arbitrary and irrational.

Because of the Dept of Interior's role in Indian affairs,

it might be helpful to solicit the views of the SG.
There is a motion to affirm
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 23, 1978

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

77-388 - State of Washington v. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation

Is this form of order acceptable?
"Probable jurisdiction is noted. The parties are
directed to address the following issue:
'Whether the partial geographi c and subject
matter jurisdiction exercised by the State of
Washington within the Yakima Indian Reservation
pursuant to Public Law 280 violates either the
statutory requirements of Public Law 280 or the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
Respectfully,

,...

~~

-vrr·---· -

;§sltj.ltrlltl' ~nurf

d t~:r %rift~ .§itcrtts

}l!cu;frtngtan, pl.

<;.

2.0?Jt2

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 23, 1978

Re: No. 77-388 - State of Washin on v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
Indian Nation
Dear John,

L.,z_

~

Your proposed order seems fine t.e-me.
Sincerely yours,

~

,.

'

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

February 23, 1978

No. 77-388 State of washington v.
Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation

Dear John:
Your proposed order is fi.ne with me.
Sincerely,

Mr . Justice Stevens
lfp/s·s
cc: The Conference

.,

1,.,,

' '
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To:

Justice Powell

Re:

No. 77-388, Washington v. Yakima Indian Tribe ~c~""-

~

c~~~+-e..c ~~~

·
This case is difficult because the language an d ~~~~~
--

legislative history of the statute are unclear.

But the

I

5""'~-

...>~

~

underlying problem is clear enough.

In 1953, Conqress ena ~

P.L. 280, authorizing states with Indian lanc'ls within thei
borders to assume jurisdiction over such lands; consent of
Indians affected was not necessary.

Enactment of P.L. 280

~·~

~~~
ar~~

the apogee of assimilationist policy towards the Indians.

~

In 1963 the State of Washinqon asserted jurisdiction
over the Yakima Indians without their consent.

Under the terms

.
'

of the assumption of jurisdiction, the State extended fuJl civil
and criminal jurisdiction to Indians and Indian lands, with the
proviso that State jurisdiction over Indians when on their tribaJ
lands or allotted lands within a reservation would only extend to
eight narrowly defined social welfare and traffic safety areas.
The State also provided that upon the request of any tribe, the
State would assume full jurisdiction over the tribe and its
lands.

--

In 1968 Congress made a siqnificant chanqe in its policy M

-

towards the Indians, abandoning the assimiJationist policy of the

lAA...

14/, !'

earlier law by amending p. L. 280 to permit States to assert
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands only with the

- ·

of the Indians affected.

-:fJ..l. '2-YIJ
cons~

1-r:>~~

-ur--

Congress did not invalidate, however,

prior unilateral assertions of jurisdiction.

This has left

the~

Yakimas doubly aggreived, not only by the unilateral assertion
jurisdiction but also by its survival after repudiation by
Congress of the policy underlying it.
22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 544 (1975).

~

~~~

Goldberg, Public Law 280,
Further exacerbatinq the

situation, according to Judge Hufstedler's dissent from the CA
9's en bane decision, is the fact that the state law enforcement
effort has been ineffective because of the patchwork jurisdiction
and the limited resources devoted to the task.
A decision invalidating Washington's prP.sent
jurisdictional statute on any ground wouJd rectify this anomalous
situation.

To reassert jurisdiction over the Yakimas under

current law (25 U.S.C. §1321(a)), the State would have to secure
their consent.

The Yakimas urge three qrounds for the invalidity

of Washington's assertion of jurisdiction.
I.

The Disclaimer Issue
A.

The Question:

Is Washington's assertion of

jurisdiction invalid because the State never amended Article XXVI
of its Constitution to remove the disclaimer of jurisdiction over
Indian land contained therein?
B.

Federal Law Governs:

The statehood enabJinq act of

1889 required that the disclaimer be embodied in the State's
constitution.

Section 6 of P.L. 280 authorized the amendment of

the State constitution to remove the disclaimer.

Section 6

provides in part,
"That the provisions of this Art shall
not become effective with respect to such
assumption of jurisdiction by any such
State until the people thereof have
appropriately amended their State
constitution or statutes as the case may
be."
The compliance of the State with the requirements of
question of fedeal law.

~6

is a

The ruling by the Washington Supreme

Court approving amendment by simple legislative action is
unassailable as a matter of state law but obviously doAs not
settle the federal question.
C.

The Case May Be Decided on this Ground:

The State

argues that the question the Court asked the parties to adoress
does not include the disclaimer issue.

"Whether the partial geographic and
subject matter jurisdiction exercised by
the State of Washington within the Yakima
Indian Reservation pursuant to Public Law
280 violates either the statutory
requirements of Public Law 280 or the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
In the view of the State, the question framed by the Court
focuses on the statutory and constitutional validity of the
assertion of partial jurisdiction, while the disclaimer argument
is an objection to any assertion of jurisdiction that is not
preceded by amendment of the State's constitution.
The SG responds that the Court's question includes any
violation by the State of the "statutory requirements of Public
Law 280."

The SG points out that the question as framed by the

Court is drawn almost verbatim from the SG's Memorandum on the
Jurisdictional Issue.

In that memorandum, the SG suggested that

the Court consider the disclaimer issue.
The State also argues that previous summary decisions of
this Court have settled the disclaimer issue.

Of the cases cited

by the State on this point, only Comenout v. Bur0en, 525 P.2d 217
(Wash. 1974), app. dfwsfg, 420 U.S. 915 (1975), presented the
disclaimer issue.

A previous ruling entered without plenary

consideration does not foreclose full consideration of the issue
at a later time.

u.s.

E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428

1, 14 (1976).
D.

The Merits of the Disclaimer Issue:

State

jurisdiction over Indian lands may be asserted only by leave of

I

the United States.
(1975).

Antoine v. Washington, 420

u.s.

194, 205

The compliance of the State with the conditions imposed

by Congress on State jurisdiction is essential to the validity of
the State's jurisdiction.
Both sides support their positions by reference to the
language of §6 of P.L. 280.

The State arques that §6 only

applies to States in which constitutional or statutory amendments
are necessary to remove "any legal impediment" to the assumption
of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian land.
All legal impediments, it points out, have been removed by the
State's legislative action asserting jurisdiction over the
Yakimas, because the State's highest court has held that only
legislative action is necessary to override the disclaimer
contained in Article XXVI of the State's constitution.
also argues that the language of

~6

The State

does not require amPndment of

the State constitution by popular referendum simply because of
the reference to "the people" of the State.

The section also

appears to refer to amendment of statutes by "the people" of the
State, but, the State insists, surely Congress contemplated
amendment of statutes by the normal state legislative process.
By the same token, State law should define the acceptable process
under §6 for amendment of the disclaimer provision of the State
Constitution.
The Yakimas, on the other hand, insist that

~6

clearly

requires amendment of the State constitution by "the people" of

the State, and that this requirement has not been met in
Washington.

Not only has there been no amendment by popular

referendum, as is called for by the Washington constitution, but
also there has been no purported amendment by any other process.
Instead, the State legislature simply enacted a statute asserting
the jurisdiction at issue in this case.

Turning the State's

argument against the State, the Yakimas aJso argue that just as
Congress must have contemplated amendment of State statutes by
normal legislative processes, it must have contemplated
constitutional amendments by normal procedures, i.e., by popular
referendum.
Both sides agree that the legislative history of

~6

shows that Congress thought that the Washington constitution,
Art. XXVI, would have to be amended before the State could assert

------------------------------------The

jurisdiction over Indian lands.

State argues, however, that

in providing for the amendment of State constitutions in §6, the
Congress thought that it was accommodating requirements of State
law, not federal law.

And, the State asserts, Congress was

clearly mistaken about the requirements of Washington law when it
supposed that a constitutional amendment was

nec~ssary.

The

passages from the legislative history cited by the State,
however, fail to support the State's full position.

They show

that in providing for amendment of State statutes in addjtion to
State constitutions, the Congress had in mjnd State law
requirements as defined by State courts.

But with reqard to thP

amendment of State constitutions, the weight of the legislative
history appears to tip towards the view that Congress was
modifying a federal law requirement when it enacted

~6.

As the Yakimas see it, the controlling legislative view
of this issue was expressed succinctly by Representative Dawson.
"Mr. Berry. Mr. Chairman, then we qet
right back to your objection. Congress
does not have to give consent to a state
to amend its constitution or its laws.
"Mr. Dawson.
Because when the Enabling
Act was passed, they said thjs state can
become a state upon certain conditions,
except for the Enabling Act.
In other
words, we restrict what they can put in
their laws and constitution to begin
with. The state cannot go any further
than their Government lets them go when
they become a state, so now we are
lifting one of those restrictions."
The statehood enabling act provided that the disclaimer in the
Washington constitution should be "irrevocable without the
consent of the United States and the people of said States
[including Washington]."

The same language was incorporated in

Article XXVI of the Washington constitution.

The Washington

Supreme Court has held that the language in the Washjnaton
constitution does not require amendment of Article XXVI by
popular referendum.

But that holding does not control or alter

the meaning of the requirement in the enabling act that the
disclaimer be altered only by the people of the State, and it was
this requirement that Congress reenacted in P.L.280, §6.

On this

view, regardless of what State law requires for the amendment of
the disclaimer provision, federal law as embodied in the enabling

act and P.L. 280 require amendment by the people of the State.
In support of this view of P.L. 280, the Yakimas cite McClanahan
v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1972).

The question in

McClanahan was whether Arizona could impose an income tax on an
Indian who lived on a reservation and had income only from
reservation sources.

In marshalling the reasons supportinq the

conclusion that Arizona had no such jurisdiction, the Court cited
P.L. 280, as amended, as evidence that only by such explicit and
special exceptions to the general rule could States assume
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian land.
"Finally, it should be noted that
Conqress has now provided a method
whereby States may assume jurisdiction
over reservation Indians. Title 25
u.s.c. §1322(a) grants the consent of the
United States to States wishing to assume
criminal and civil jurisdiction over
reservation Indians, and 25 U.S.C. §1324
confers upon the States the riqht to
disregard enablinq acts which limit their
authority over such Indians. But the Act
expressly provides that the State must
act 'with the consent of the tribe
occupying the particular Indian country",
25 U.S.C. ~1322(a), and must
'appropriately [amend] its constitution
or statutes.'
25 U.S.C. §1324. Once
aqain, the Act cannot be read as
expressly conferring tax immunity on
Indians.
But we cannot believe that
Congress would have required the consent
of the Indians affected and the amendment
of those state constitutions which
~rohibit the assumption of jurisdiction
1f the States were free to accomplish the
same goal unilaterally by simple
legislative enactment."
411 U.S. at 177-78 (footnotes omitted).

In reply to this argument by the Yakimas, the State
suggests that the only purpose of the requirements imposed by ~6
is to ensure that federal jurisdiction and responsibility will
not lapse before there is some positive expression of willinqness
on the part of the State to assume jurisdiction over Indian
lands.

I doubt that the language of §6 can bear that

interpretation, and I am sure that the State has cite~ nothjnq in
the legislative history to support this interpretation of

~6.

On balance, I would resolve this question in favor of
the Yakimas.

The language of the enabling act appears to require

alteration of the disclaimer by the people of the State.

P.L.

280 takes this view of the enabling act and as a consequence
requires amendment by ordinary procedures (popular referendum) as
a condition of assertion of jurisdiction by the State.

This is a

requirement of federal law established in the Anablinq act and
reiterated in P.L. 280, and the State has no power to assume
jurisdiction without complying with the condition.

The languaqe

of §6 fairly bears this construction.
The State objects that there is no good reason for
Congress to require popular amendment of the disclaimer if statP
law allows legislative amendment.

The SG speculates that

Congress may have required popular referendum bPcause of the
significant burdens and tensions associated with State
jurisdiction over Indian lands, but this is only speculation.
seems more likely to me that the reenactment of the requirement

It

in P.L. 280 is an echo of the constitutional theory embodied in
the Enabling Act.

That act provided for the people of the

Territory of Washington to elect delegates to a constitutionaJ
convention that would draft a proposed constitution for the new
State.

That proposed constitution, necessarily containinq the

disclaimer clause called for by the enabling act, was then to be
submitted to the people of the Territory at a referendum.

For

the same reason that popular approval was necessary to enact the
new constitution, it was necessary to aJter the terms of the
constitution, including the disclaimer; hence the enabling act
required that the disclaimer be irrevocable without the consent
of the people.

Public Law 280 preserves the requirement

originally imposed by the enabling act.
E.

Practical Consequences of a Decision for the Yakimas

on the Disclaimer Issue:

The invalidation of Washington's

assertion of jurisdiction over the Yakimas, based on the
disclaimer issue, would invalidate all assertions of
by Washinqton.

~urisdiction

This would include not only uniJateraJ assertions

~

such as the one at issue here, but also those made with the
consent of the Indians involved.

This would affect approximately

20,000 Indians, of whom 8,000 have consented to jurisdiction and
another 6,000 of whom are Yakimas.

It would also affect those

non-Indians living on land within reservations.

Washinqton

woul~

not be able to reassert jurisdiction over any of these Indians or
their land, even with their consent, until its people had amended

..

' J.

Article XXVI of the state constitution.
In other States, assertions of jurisdiction not preceded

~

by the requisite constitutional amendment would also be
invalidated.

According to the

~

bane majority opinion of the CA

9, the other disclaimer States that have asserted

~urisdictjon

over Indian lands are Arizona, Utah, North Dakota, and Montana.
Goldberg, Public Law 280, supra, adds South Dakota to the list,
but its assertion of jurisdiction has been invalidated by the
South Dakota Supreme Court.
435, 125 N.W.2d 829.

Petition of Julia Hankins, 80 S.D.

Arizona does not appear to have amended the

disclaimer clause of its constitution, Article XX, para. 4, so
the validity of its limited assertion of jurisdiction over air
and water pollution control would be placed in question.

Utah

has not amended the diclaimer in Art. III of its constitution.
Montana readopted its disclaimer as Art. I of its 1972
constitution and has not alteren it, so its assertion of criminal
jurisdiction over the Flathead Reservation would be invalidated.
North Dakota has amended its disclaimer, Art. XVI, §203, as
required by P.L. 280.
II.

The Partial Jurisdiction Issue
A.

The Question:

Washington assumed criminal and civil

jurisdiction over Indians and Indian country within the State in
1963, but provided that the jurisdiction would not extend to
Indians on their tribal lands or allotted lands held in trust,
unless the Indian tribe consented to full jurisdiction or a

matter arose within one of eight narrowly defined cateqories of
jurisdiction.

The question is whether P.L. 280, as it stood in

1963, allowed the assertion of this kind of partial State
jurisdiction.
B.

Discussion:

The result of the assumption of

jurisdiction by Washington is aptly described as a ~urisdictional
"crazy quilt," with jurisdiction depending upon the place the
case arises, the race of the plaintiff or the defendant or both,
and the subject matter of the case.

The inconveniences of such a

jurisdictional system are obvious, and I wil1 not rehearse them
here.
There is no specific legislative history that sheds any
~ on this problem of part]al jurisdiction.

Law 280, supra, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 555.

Goldberg, Public

As a result, we are

consigned to the language, structure, and qeneral purpose of the
statute for evidence of the acceptability of Washinqton's
jurisdictional scheme.
The Indians and the SG start with the premise that

~6

and §7 of P.L. 280 allow assertions of jurisdiction by Washinqton
only if the terms of the jurisdictional assumption are consistent
with §2 and §4 of the statute.

Sections 2 and 4 are the sections

conferring jurisdiction over Indian country on five States (known
as the "mandatory States").

The Indians arque that since §2 and

§4 conferred complete civil and criminal jurisdiction on the five
mandatory States, the "option states" (States such as Washinqton

which may but need not assume jurisdiction over Indians and
Indian land) must make an equally complete assumption of
jurisdiction.

The SG, in a more moderate stance, notes that in

-------

some cases entire named reservations were excluded from State

-

jurisdiction in the mandatory States, and concludes that similar
~-----..........

geographic exclusions by the option states would be consistent
with P.L. 280.

The SG also concedes that assertion of either

complete civil or complete criminal jurisdiction would be
consistent with the statute, though no such partial subject
matter jurisdiction was approved by §2 and

~4.

Both the Indians and the SG agree that the assertion of
jurisdiction at issue in the present case is c.911tr.§.l"y to the

A #: #·~

purposes of P.L. 280.
"The primary concern of Congress in
'----------~-------enacting Pub. L. 280 that emerges from its sparse legislative
history was with the problem of lawlessness on certain Indian
reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal institutions for
law enforcement."
(1976).

Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379

A secondary purpose of the law was promotion of the

assimilation of Indians into the qeneral population.

Both of

these purposes are better served, the Yakimas and the SG arque,
by a construction of P.L. 280 requiring a more complete
assumption of jurisdiction than the one made by Washington.

The

dissent from the CA 9's en bane consideration of the present case
adopted this argument from the purposes of the statute as the
basis for its conclusion that Washington's assertion of partial

jurisdiction did not comply with P.L. 280.
The State argues that the disclaimer in its enablinq act
and State constitution only eschews jurisdiction over lands
"owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes," and that lands
within reservations but held in fee by non-Indians are not
included within the scope of the disclaimer.

The State concJudes

that its assertion of jurisdiction over such lands is not
controlled by Art. XXVI of its constitution or by P.L. 280.

So

far as I can tell, this is a novel and unacceptable construction
of the scope of the disclaimer and the enabling act.

It seems

more reasonable and more in line with long-accepted practice to
conclude, as the SG does, that the disclaimer applies to all
~1151,

"Indian country" as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C.
including all land within the limits of a reservation.

Section 7 of P.L. 280 authorizes the State to assume
jurisdiction "in such manner as the people of the State shall
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof."

•••

Accordinq to

the State, "in such manner" allows the State to make a partial
territorial assertion of jurisdiction within the Yakima
reservation.

It also, in the view of the State, allows the State

to assert partial subject matter jurisdiction and leave to the
Yakimas the choice as to whether the jurisdiction should be
expanded to full jurisdiction.

This idea of leaving a choice to

the Indians by adopting the partial jurisdiction scheme underlies
the State's strongest argument on the partial jurisdiction

question.
In Quinault Tribe v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1966), theCA 9 held that the assertion of jurisdiction by
Washington was total, rather than partial, because the Indians
could petition the State at any time to assume full jurisdiction
over all Indian country.

While it is true that in a sense this

jurisdictional plan leaves the Indians with what they regard as a
Hobson's choice, since the alternative of no state jurisdiction
is excluded, it is also true that this exclusion was consistent
with P.L. 280's authorization of unilateral assertions of
jurisdiction between 1953 and 1968.

Leaving this (limited)

choice to the Yakimas does not detract from achievement of the
primary goal of P.L. 280, the restoration of effective law
enforcement on the reservations.

The State stands ready to

assume full jurisdiction at any time, should the Indians decide
that they would prefer full jurisdiction.

I think there is

considerable force in the argument that for the purposes of P.L.
280 the assertion of jurisdiction by Washington is effectively
full jurisdiction, even though at the same time it preserves the
opportunity for some degree of sovereignty for the Yakimas if
they wish it.
The State also argues that the assertion of jurisdjction
by Washington was ratified in the passage of the 1968 amendments
to P.L. 280.

The 1968 amendments authorized assumptions of

partial subject matter jurisdiction, though only with the consent

of the Indians affected.

The repeal of §7 of P.L. 280 provided

that the repeal had no effect on any assertion of jurisdiction
~he

made pursuant to §7 before its repeal.

State reqards this

saving clause as a ratification of Washington's jurisdictional
scheme.

But the SG argues, with good reasons, that the saving

clause merely leaves the validity of the earlier assumptions of
jurisdiction by the States unaffected by the 1968 law, and does
not settle the question of the validity of state assumptions of
jurisdiction under earlier law.
C.

Consequences of a Decision for the Yakimas on the

Partial Jurisdiction Issue:

A holding for the Yakimas on the

limited partial jurisdiction ground suggested by the SG would
affect about 10,000 Indians in Washington, according to the
dissent in the CA 9 en bane decision.

Of those, about two-thirds

are parties in interest in this lawsuit.
Other States with either partial geographic jurisdiction
or partial subject matter jurisdiction inconsistent with the
principles suggested by the SG (that is, States with jurisdiction
over less than entire reservations, or over less than all civil
or all criminal cases) are Arizona, Iowa, Idaho, and North
Dakota.

Montana exercises criminal jurisdiction over an entire

reservation.

Arizona and Washington, as well as Montana, are

already on the list of disclaimer states that have asserted
jurisdiction without amending their state constitutions.

Arizona

has assumed jurisdiction over Indian lands only with reqard to

air and water pollution control.
III.

The Equal Protection Issue
I must confess at the outset that I have difficulty

getting a firm grasp on just what it is about the Washinqton
jurisdictional scheme that Judge Hufstedler and her CA 9 panel
found to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause.

The

objectionable feature appears to have been the assertion of
criminal law jurisdiction over land held in fee within the
reservation without a matching assertion of jurisdiction over nonfee or trust land.

The panel termed this "the classification

based on the status of title to the land upon which an alleqed
criminal offense occurs."

In the view of theCA 9 panel, this

assertion of jurisdiction defined by the title to the land on
which the crime occurs results in a situation in which an Indian
living on a parcel of non-fee land who is the victim of a crime
has no law enforcement protection from the State, while an Indian
living on fee land does enjoy such protection.

What the panel

was getting at, I think, is that the jurisdictional scheme
classifies people according to whether they live on Indian or nonIndian land.
The CA 9 panel concluded that the tit1e-based system
criminal jurisdiction was not based on racial classifjcations,
since both Indians and non-Indians live on both fee and non-fee
lands.

Nor could the CA 9 find any basis for thinkinq that the

classification actually adopted was only a mask for invidious

~

o~

racial discrimination.

The CA 9 applied the rational basis test,

and concluded that Washington's assumption of iurisdiuction

----------

failed to meet that standard.

__.::::-"---- - - - - - - -

I cannot see, however, that the classification in

question has resulted in any denial of equal protection.

The

State does not leave Indians on non-fee lands without criminal
law protection.

Whatever jurisdiction the State does not assume

is retained by the federal government and the tribal council, so
there is no hiatus.

Further, the Indians can have the benefjt of

full State jurisdiction for the asking.

It is also worth noting

that under current law the State is authorized to make an
assumption of partial subject matter jurisdiction, albeit only
with the consent of the Indians affected.
The State also suggests what to my mind is a satisfying
rationale for the title-based classification embodied in the
assumption of jurisdiction.

--

The State unilaterally asserted full

------------------------

jurisdiction over all land held in fee within the reservation,
but only partial subject matter jurisdiction over non-fee and
trust lands.

The State suggests that this classification served

~

the purpose of allowing the Indians to preserve a larqe measure
of autonomy and self-government on Indian lands.

The Indians

were given a choice between retaining limited autonomy, or of
acceding to full state jurisdiction.

The State has a legitimate

interest in allowing the Indians within its borders to preserve
some measure of tribal autonomy, even while the State is movinq

to provide effective law enforcement within the reservation.
classification adopted is related reasonably to that purpose.

~he

.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-388

~w

State of Washington et al.,
Appellants,

On Appeal from the United
States Court of Appeal$
for the Ninth Circuit..
Confederated Bands and Tribes
of the Yakima Indian Nation.

/?-/~7

v.

{Ja,nuary -, 1979]

MR.

~
k~~

delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are called upon to resolve a dispute between ~~u
the State of Washington and the Yakima Indian Nation over
the validity of the State's exercise of jurisdiction on the ~ ~
Yakima Reservation. In 1963 the Washington Legislature ~ A.JA ~~"~ •• .J
obligated the Sta.te to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction
·-.r~
over Indians and Indian territory within the State, subject '-""....,..-z:;....u.t~.u.~Hi:...-.'-tl!~'
only to the condition that in all but eight subject-matter ~ ~
areas jurisdiction would not extend to Indians on trust or- I
~
restricted lands without the request of the Indian tribe af-. J
~ ~
fected. Ch. 36, 1963 Washington Laws. 1 The Yakima Nation ~
JusTICE STEWAR'.r

.J.

~

The statute, codified as R. C. W. S. 37.12.010, provides:
of criminal and civil juris(liction by state
" Assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction by sta.te. The State of
Washington hereby obligates and bind:s itself to a<i<>'ume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and
lands within this state in accordance with the con;;ent of the United States
given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public La.w 280, 83rd Congrffi.S, 1st
Session), but such as;;umption of jurisdiction shall not app!y to Indians
when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an e-stablished Indian
reservation and held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States, unless the provisions
1

~'Assumption

'.

~·

r.

·'

...'
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did not make such a request. State authority over Indians
within the Yakima Reservation was thus made by Chapter 36
to depend on the title status of the property on which the
offense or transaction occurred and upon the nature of the
subject-matter.
'The Yakima Nation brought this action in a federal district
court challenging the statutory and constitutional validity of
the State's partial assertion of jurisdiction on its Reservation.
The Tribe contended that the federal statute upon which the
State based its authority to assume jurisdiction _over the
Re&'rvation, Public Law 83-280/ imposed certain procedural
requirements, with which the State had not complied,-most
notably, a requirement that Washington first amend its own
constitution-and that in any event Pub. L. 280 did not
authorize the State to assert only pa.rtial jurisdiction within
an Indian Reservation. Finally, the Tribe contended that
Chapter 36. even if authorized by Congress, violated the Equal
Protection and. Due Process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The District Court rejected both the statutory and constiof R. C. W. 37.12.021 (tribal con~:~eut) have been invoked, except for the· ·
following:
"(1) Compulsory school attendance;
"(2) Public as~:~istance;
" (3) Domestic relations;
" ( 4) Mrntn] Illness;
" ( 5) ,Juvenile delinquency;
" ( 6) Adoption proceedings;
" (7) Dependent children; and
"(8) Operation of mott>r vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads·
and highways; Provided further, That Indian tribt>S that petitioned for,
were granted and brcame subject to state juri:;diction purl:luant to this ·
chapter on or before March 13, 1963 shall remain subject tg state civil and
criminal jurisdiction as if chapter 36, Laws of 1963 had not been enacted."'
The statute will be referred to in this opinion Hl:i Chapter 36.
2
Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588-590.. For the fuU t~t of
the Act, see n . 9, infmo

•"

'·'
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tutional claims and entered judgment for the State. 3 On
appeal, the contention that Washington's assumption of only
partial jurisdiction was not authorized by Congress was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting
en bane. The en bane court then referred the case to the
original panel for consideration of the remaining issues. Cort;federated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima. Indian 1\·ation of
Washington, 550 F. 2d 443 (Yakirn:a 1).4 The three-judge
panel, confining itself to consideration of the constitutional
validity of Chapter 36, concluded that the "checkerboard"
jurisdictional system it produced was without any rational
3 The complaint. also eontained other ela.in1>1 that were decidf'd adver~ely
to t,he plaintiff by the Di~trict Court. After extensive dit>e.overy and the
entry of a pretrial order, the Dib1rict Court granted partial ;,;ummary
judgment. in favor of thf' Shtte on seveml of thesf' claims. On the que~
tion of compliance with Pub. L. 280, the District Court held tha.t it wa~
bound by the decision of thf' Court. of AppeaJs for the Ninth Circuit in
Quinault v. Gallagher, 368 F. 2d 648, 655-658 (1966), which had determined that the State of Wa~hrngton could accept juriHdietion undt·r Pub.
L. 280 without. firt)t amending its con:;t,itution and that Washington's
jurhsdictional arrangement did not, constitute an authorized partial a~Ssump
tion of juri~diction . The Di~t.rict Court also rejc;>cted thfl rlaim that
Chapter 36 was facially invalid under the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The question of the
constitutional validity of Chapter 86 a:; appliro to the Yakima Re~ervation
was reserved for a hearing and factual determination. After a. onl:'-week
trial, the Di:st.rict. Court. found tlutt. tlw appellee had not proved "that the
state or county ha.ve discriminated ... to deprive any Indian or the
plaintiff Tribe of any service or protection, resource or aSIS('t. afforded
under the same state law to other citi21ens or similar geographic location."
The complaint .wu.s then dismissed .
The opmion of the District Court is unreported.
1 The en bane hearing was ordered by the Court of Appeal:,; sua sponte
after the original panel had heard ar~~:ument . This hearing wa;; limited to
the que,;tion whether that Court's earlier partia.l juri:sdiction holding in
Quinault v. Gallagher, supra, n. 3, should be overruled. A majority of the
en bane panel agreed with the result in Quinault, finding no statutory
1mpediment to the assumpt.ion of partial geographic and subjert-mat.ter
jurisdiction 550 F . 2d 443, 448. Four judges dissented. ld., at 441t
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foundation and therefore violative of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no basis upon
which to sever the offending portion of the legislation, the
appellate court declared Chapter 36 unconstitutional in its
entirety, and reversed the judgment of the District Court.
'Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation
of Washington, 552 F. 2d 1132 (Ya:kima II).
The State then brought an appeal to this Court. In noting
probable jurisdiction of the appeal, we requested the parties
to address the issue whether the ~ pa.rtial geographic and
subject-matter jurisdiction ordained by Chapter '36 is author'ized by federal la.w, as well as the Equal Protection Clause
issue. 435 U. S. 903;5
~The thre!'-judge appellate com·t's equal protection deci;;ion was based
upon the diJ::parity cr.ea.ted by Chapier 36 in ma.king criminal juri!:idiction
over Indian,; dPpend upon whet.hPr thP a.Ueged offerLSe occurred on fee or
nonfee land. 5.52 F. 2d 1;~32, 1334-1335. The court found this criterion
for the ext>rcise of stMe cr.iminal ]urisdiction facially uncon;;titutional.
The appellate court found it unnPrt>S:><u~·, tht>refore, to reach t.he Tribe's
content.ion that the eight. ~tatu1or~r cntegorie~ of sltbjt>c1-matter juri~Sdiction
are vague or its furtht•r cont(>ntion that the application of Chapter 36
deprived it of equal protection of the la.w;;. 550 F. 2d, at 1884.
In its Motion to Affirm, filed here in response to t.he appellants' jurisdictional Statement, the Yakima Nation invo~ed in !:iUpport of the judgment.
"each and every one" of the eontentions it had made in the District Court
and Court of Appeals, "bttt. limitt>"d its di~cttssicm to the equa.J protection
rationale relied upon by the appellate court. In its brief on the merits
the Tribe has addressed-in addition to those subjects implicit in ol)r
order not.ing probable jurisdiction, see n. 20, infra, one issue tha.t merits
brief discus.->ion. The Tribe contends that Chapter 86 is void for failure
to meet the standards of definitenel:iS required by the Due Process Clause
' of the Fourteenth Amendment, m;serting tha.t the eight subject-matter
categories over which the State has extended full jurisdiction are too vague
t o give tribal members adequate notice of wha.t conduct is punishable
under ~tate law. This challenge i;; without merit. As the District. Court
uhserved, Chapter 86 creates no new criminal offenses but merely extends
jurisdiction over certain classes of offen;;es defined elsewhere il1 sta.te law.
If thofi(J offenses are not, sufficiently defined, individual tribal members may
· defend against any prosecutions under them at the time such prosecutions

'•·
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I
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian
Nation comprise 14 originally distinct Indian tribes that
joined together in the middle of the 19th century for purposes
of their relationships with the United States. A treaty was
signed with the United States in 1855, under which it was
agreed that the various tribes would be considered "one nation" and that specified lands located in the Territory of
Washsington would be set aside for their exclusive us~. The
treaty was ratified by Congress in 1859. 12 Stat. 951. Since
that time, the Yakima Nation has without interruption maiutained its tribal identity.
The Yakima .Reservation is located in the southeastern part
of the State of Washington and now consists of approximately
1,387,505 acres of land, of which some 80% is held in trust by
the United States for the Yakima Nation or individual members of the Tribe. The remaining parcels of land are held in
fee by Indian and non-Indian owners. Much of the trust
acreage on the .Reservation is forest. The Tribe receives the
bulk of its income from timber, and over half Of the .Reservation is closed to permanent settlement in order to protect the
forest area. The remaining lands a.re primarily agricultural
There are three incorporated towns on the Reservation, the
largest being Toppenish, with a population of under 6,000.
The land held in fee is scattered throughout the. Reservation, but most of it is concentrated in the northeastern portion
close to the Yakima River and within the three towns of
Toppenish, Wapato, and Harrah. Of the 25,000 permanent
residents of the Reservation, 3,074 are members of the Yakima
are hrought. See Younger v. HmTis, 401 U. S. 37. The eight subjectmatter areas are themtselves defined with reasonable clarity in langua.ge no
lesl'l JH't'eise than that commonly aeeeptcd in federal jurisdictional sta.tutes
in t.he same field. Set> United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544. The
D1strict Court's ruling that Cha.pter 36 i:s not void for vagut>nr,.;::; under the
Due Process Clause of the. Fmtrte.e.nth Amendment wa.s therefore correct.

.,.

"·
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Nation. and tribal members live in all of the inhabited a.reas
of the Reservation. 6 In the three towns-where over half of
the non-Indian population resides-members of the Tribe are
substantially outnumbered by non-Indian residents occupying
fee land .
Before the enactment of the state law here in issue, the
Yakima Nation was subject to the general jurisdictional principles that apply in Indian country in the absence of federal
legislation to the contrary. Under those principles, which
received their first and fullest expression in Worcester v.
Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 517, state law reaches within the exterior
boundaries of an Indian reservation only if it would not
infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S.
217, 219-220.7 As a practical matter, this has meant that
criminal offenses by or aga.inst Indians have been subject only
to federal or tribal laws, Moe v. Salish & Kooten£Li Tribes, 425
U. S. 463 (1976), except where Congress in the exercise of its
plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs ha.s "expressly
provided that State laws shall apply." McClan£than v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. ~. 164, 170--171.
Pub. L. 280, upon which the State of Washington relied for
its authority to assert jurisdictiou over the Yakima Reservation under Chapter 36, was enacted by Congress in 1953 in
part to deal with the "problem of lawlessness on certain
Indian reservations, and the absence of adequate tribal insti6 The:: :e are Lhe member~hip figtll'eH given by the District Court.
The
United States, in its amicus curiae brief, has indicated that more than
t>,OOO tribal members live permanently on the Heservation and that the
number incrPU;;('S during the ;summer month~-; .
1 The:;e abstmct principles do not and could not adequately describe the
compkx jurisdictional rules that luwe developed over the years in cases
mvolvmg jnrisclictional classes between the State:; and tribal In,dians ~ince
Worre11ter v. Gl!orgia was decided. For a full tre;ttment of the subject, see
gPnerally M. Price, Law and the Ame.ric:m Indian (1973); U . S. Dept.
lpt., Federal I11dia:u Lu w (1958) ,
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tutions for law enforcement." Bryan v. lta.sca County, 473.
U. S. 373, 379; H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6
(1953) . The basic terms of Pub. L. 280, which was the first
federal jurisdictional statute of general applicability to Indian
Reservation lands, 8 are well known. 9 To five States it effected
an immediate cession of criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indian country, with an express exception for the reservations
See M . Price, sup·ra, n. 7, at 210. Before 1958, there had been other
surrenders of authority to some States. See, e. g., 62 Stat. 1224, 26
U. S. C. § 232 (New York), 64 Stat. 845, 25 U. S. C. § 233 (New York
1950); Act. of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat.. 249 (Ka.nsa.;;); Act of
May 31, 1946, ch. 279, 60 Stat. 229 (North Dakota); and Act of June 30,
1948, rh. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (Iowa). Pub. L. 280, however, wa~; the first
federal statute to attempt au omnibus transfer.
9 The Act provides in full :
"AN ACT To ronfer jurisdiction on the States of California., Minnesota.,
Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconb1n, with reo;pect to criminal offenses and
civil cau~es of action committ-ed or arising on Indian reservations within
such States, and for other purposes
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives . of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That chapter 53 of title
18, United States Code, is hereby amended by inserting at the end of the
chapter analysis preceding section 1151 of such title the following new
item :
"'1162. State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or a.gaim;t Indian~
in the Indian rountry.'
"SBC. 2. Title 18, United States Code, is hereby amended by inserting
in cha.p ter 53 thereof immediately a,fter section 1161 a new section, to he
designated a~ section 1162, as follows:
"§ llti2. State juri~diction over offenses committed by or against Indians·
in the Indian country
" (a) Each of t.he State~ listed in the following table shall have Jurisdiction over offenses committed by or ngainst Indians in the a.rooo; of Indian
country li,;ted opposite the name of the State to the ~ame extent that such
State has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the State,
and the criminal law~ of ::;uch State shall have the same force and effect
within such Ind.iru) country as they have elliewhexe within the State:.
8

·.

''

·~
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of three tribes. Pub. L. 280, §§ 2 and 4. 10 To the remaining
States it gave an option to assume jurisdiction over criminal
offenses and civil causes of action in Indian country without
"State of
Indian count.ry affect('(l
California
All Indian country within the State
Minne~oht.
All Indian country within the State, pxcept the Red Lake
Reservation
Nebraska
All Indian country within the Stat.e
AU Indian rountry within the State, except the Warm Springs
Oregon
Re.'ltlrva,tion
Wiscon~in
All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee
ReservtLtion
"(b) Nothjng in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance,
or taxation of any rettl or pE'rsonal Jlroperty, including wa.t er rights,
belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is
held in tru:>t by the United Stutes or is :c;ubject to a restriction ag.aiJH!!t
alienation imposed by the United State:>; or shall authorize regulation of
the use of such property in a manner incon~Sistent with any Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute or with any r<>gulation :qwde pursuant thereto; or
f<hall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any
right., privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or
sta,tute with respect. to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control,
licensing, or regulation thereof.
" (c) The provisions of sections 115'2 and 1153 of thi~ chapter shall not
be applicable within the areas of Indian country listed in subsection (a) of
this S<>ct ion."
"SEC. 3. ChaptPr 85 of titl£' 23, United States Code, is hereby amended
by mserting at the end of the chapter analysis preceding section 1331 of
such title the following new item:
'' '1:360. State civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties!
"SEC. 4. Title 28, United States Code, is herpby amendPd by inserting·
in chapter 85 thereof immediately after sect.ion 1359 a new section, to be
designated as f<ection 1360, as follows:
;'§ 1360. Stat.e civil jurisdiction in actions to which Indians are parties
"(a) Each of the State:-; listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of act.ion between Indians or to which Indians are
-parties which arise in the areas of Indian country listed opposit£' the name
Qf the State to the same extent tlmt such Sutte has jurii:idiction over othef'

[Footnote 10 is o'l!' p . 10]
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consulting with or securing the consent of the tribes that
would be affected. States whose constitutions or statutes
'Contained organic law disclaimers of jurisdiction over Indiat\
·"

civil ca.uses of action, and thm;e civil laws of such State that are of general
application to private persons or private property shall have the same
force and effect within ~;uch Indian cow1try as they have elsewhere within
the State :
Indian country affected
"State of
California All Indian country within the Statt'
Minnesota All Indian eountry within the State, except the Red La.k~
Reservation
Nebraska
All Indian country within the State
Oregon
All Indian country within the State, except the Wa.rm Spring!
Reservation
All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee
Wisconsin
Reservation
" ' (b) Nothing in this section shaJI authorize the alienation, eneum·
brance, or ta.xa.tjon of a.ny real of personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or a.ny Indian tribe, band, or community
t.hat i11 held in trust by the LJnited States or is subject to 11 re::;triction
ag:~inst alienat.ion imposed by the United Sta.tes; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such property in a. manner inconsistent with any Federal
treaty, agrPement, or statute or with a.ny regulation made pursuant
thereto ; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
proba.te proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession oi
such property or any int~rest therein.
"' (c) Any tribal ordinanre or cu:,:tom heretofOI'e or hereafter adopted
by an Indian tribe, band, or community in the exercise of any authority
which it, may po~:seS~> shall, if not incon~istent. with uny applicnble civil
law of the State, be given full force and effect in the determinat-ion of
civil ca.uses of action pursuant to this section.'
"SEC. 5. Section 1 of the Act of October 5, 1949 (63 Stat . 705, ch.
604), is hereby repealed, but such repeal shall not affect any proceedings
beretoforu instituted under that section.
'"SEC. 6. Notwithstanding tlw provi~;ions of a.ny Enabling Act for the
admission of a Sta.t,e, the consent of the United States is hereby given to
the people of ;my Sta.te (() amend, where necessary, their Sta.te con::;titution
'Or existing statutes, as the case ma.y be., to remove a.ny !ega.! impediment

.,
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country were dealt with in § 6. 11 The people of those States
were given permission to arnen(l; "where necessary" their state
constitution or existing statutes to remove any legal impediment to the assl.j.ri.1ption of Jurisdiction. under the Act. Pub.
L. 280, § 6. All others were covered in § 7. 12
The Washington Constitution coutains a disclaimer of authority over Indian country,~ a aJ1d the State is, therefore, one
of those covered by § 6 of Pub. L. 280. · The State did not
take any action under the purported authority of Pub. L. 280
until 1957. ln that year its legislature enacted a statute
which obligated the State to assume criminal and civi·J juris~
diction over any Indian reservation within the State at the
request of the tribe affected. 14 Under this legislation state
jurisdiction was requested by and exte11ded to several Iudi~1
tribes within the State.15

'·

,.

to the rtssumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with tl1e
provisions of thi;; Act.: Provided,· That the provisions of this Art shall not
become ,effective with re,spect to such assumption of juri~diction by nny
such State until the people tl1ereof have upproprin,t ,ely amended their
State const.itution or ,;tatnte~ as the case may be.
" SEC. 7. The con,;ent of the United Statr~:~ il'l hrreby givNI to any
other State not having juri~diction with respect to criminal offen&-s .or
civil c<Luses of actjon, or with respect to both, as provided for in t.hi:s Act,
to a&;ume jmisdiction at such time aild in such manner us the people of
the Sbte :>hall, by affirmative legislative action, obligate and bind the
Stn.t10 t,o a:ssumption thereof."
10 See n . 9, supra.
The five Stat.es· given immrcli~te jurisdiction were
California., Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wi:sconsin . Alaska was
added to this group in 1958. Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615,
72 Stat. 545 (1958), codified at 18 U.S. C . § 1162 (1976), 28 U.S. C.§ 1360
(1976).
11 See n. 9, supra.
J~ S(>e n . 9, supm.
n Wa~h. C'..onst., Art. XXVI, 2.
H lL C. W. ch. 07.12.
1
'' For a detailed discussion of the Washington history under Pub. L. 280,
see 1 National American Indian Court, Judges Ass'n: The 1m pact · of
Public La,w 280 upon the Administration of Criminal .lu:stice on Indian
Reservation~ ( 1974) (hereinafter 1 Indian Court ,fudges) .

,f
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In one of the first prosecutions brought under the 1957
jurisdictional scheme, an Indian defendant whose tribe had
consented to the extension of jurisdiction challenged its validity on the ground that the disclaimer clause in the state
constitution had not been amended in the mauner allegedly
required by § 6 of Pub. L. 280. State v. Paul, 53 W. 2d 789
(1959). The Washington Supreme Court rejected the argument, construing the state constitutional provision to mean
that the barrier posed by the disclaimer could be lifted by the
state legis1ature. ' 0
In 1963, Washington enacted Chapter 36, the law at issue
in this 1itigation.l7 The most significant featqre of the new
statute was its provision for the extension of at least some
jurisdiction over all Indian lands within the Sta.te, whether or
not the affected tribe gave its consent. Full criminal and
civil jurisdiction to the extent permitted by Pub. L. 280 was
extended to all fee lands in every Indian reservation and to
trust and allotted lands therein when non-Indians were involved. Except for eight categories of law, however, state
.iurisdiction was not extended to Indians on allotted and trust
lands unless the affected tribe so requested. The eight jurisdictional categories of state law that were thus extended to all
parts of every Indian reservatioll were in the areas of compul~
sory school attendance, public assistance, domestic relations,
men tal illness, juvenile delinquency, adoption proceedings,
dependent children, and motor vehicies. 18
10 The Wwshington Supreme C-ourt relied upon a previou:; dl.'cision in
which it had rejected a challenge to Washington legislation permitting
tn,xat10n of property leased from the FPderal Government. Boeing Aircraft v. Recon.structwn Pinance Corp•., 25 W. 2d 652 (1982). The Boeing'
11-'~l~lation was challengl.'d on th£~ ground t.hat the State had faill'd to
l'!.'lllUvtl by amendmf•nt a constitutional disclaimer of authority to tax
fedl.'rul property, and the Wa:shington Court held in Boeing that IPgJsla.tive.:
a.ct.ion was IStlfficient.
11

See n. 1, supra.

1s See n . 1 aJld n . 5,

supra~

77-388-0PINION
12

WASHINGTON v. YAKIMA INDIAN NATION

The Yakima Indian Nation did not request the full measure
of jurisdiction made possible by Cha.pter 36, and the Yakima
Reservation thus became subject to the system of jurisdiction outlined at the outset of this opinion.19 This litigation
followed .
II
The Yakima Nation relies on three separate and independent grounds in asserting that Chapter 36 is invalid. First, it
argues that under the terms of Pub. L. 280 Washington was
not authorized to enact Chapter 36 until the state constitution
had been amended by "the people" so as to eliminate its Art.
XXVI which disclaimed state authority over Indian lands.>!o
19 Tho:se tribf'S that had con:sentPd to :slate juri::;dict.ion under the 1957'
law remainrd fully subject to ~<uch juriwiction. R. C. W. :~7112.010
(1976). Since 1963 only one tribr, the Colville, hn.s requested the P.xten~
siqn of full state jurisdiction. 1 Indian Court Judgrs, supra, n. 15, at
77-81. The Yakima Nation, P.VE>r ::;inre 1952 when its repre:sentativPs
objt>dP.d before a congre:s.sional eommittff' to a predect>ssor of Pub. L. 280,
see n. 33, infra, has con::>i~:;tmtly contested· the wisdom and the legality of
at.t.empt:; by the State to exercii>e juri::;diction over it~; Re:servation la,nds.
See ibid.
>!0 Wal'<hington ~;trenuously argues that. t.his que:stion is not properly
before tht1 Court. We think that it 1~. The Yakima Indian Nation has
pressed thi:s issue throughout tfle litigation. Tn it~; motion to Dismi"-; o-r
Affirm, the alleg:ed invalidity of Wa,.;hington's legi:slative a.s:sumption of
jurisdiction was presented as a basis upon which the judgment below
should be sustained. See n. 5, supra. As the prt>v<tiling party, the appel·
loe was of course free to dP.fmd it.-: judgment on nn); ground properly
rai;;ed below whether or not that ground was relif'd upon, rejectP.d, or even
con:sidered by the District Court. or the Court of Appeals. United States
v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435-436; Dandri-dge v. WilliarM,
397 lT. S. 471, 475, and n. 6. Moreover, the disclaimer issue was implicit
in the snbJects the parties were reque:>ted to address in our order noting
prohnble jurisdiction of this appeal. 435 U. S. 903. Cf. Gent v. Arkansas,
384 1'. S. 937; Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Cornrnission, 401 U.S. 931.
Washington alw contend;; that this Court's summary disnus.-;als in
Makah Indian Tribe v. Washington, 76 Wash. 2d 485, 457 P. 2d 4gp
(1969), appeal dismi;;::;ed, 397 U. S. 316; Tonasket v. Washington, 84
Wash. 2d 164, 525 P . 2d 744 {1974), appeal dismissed, 420 U. S. 915; a.nd,
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Secolld, it contends that Pub. ~· 280 does not authorize a
State to extend only partial jurisdiction over an Indian reservation. Finally, it asserts that Chai)ter 36, even if authorized
by Pub. L. 280, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. We turn now to consideration of each of these
arguments,
Comeno·u t v. Burdrnan, 84 Wash. 2d 192, appeal di~mi~sed, 420 U. S. 915,
should preclude reconsideration of the disclaim~r it-!ISue here. In t.host?
cases, it had beeu argued that Wa~hington's statutory assumption of
juri;;diction wa.~ ineffective under Pub. L. 280 and invalid under the state
constitution bec:tu:oe of the ab:oence of a const.itutiona,J amendment eliminating Chapter XXVI. In each cas~, the Washington Supreme Court
rejected both t.h e state constitutional and the federal argtunent:>.
appeal from each, the appellants que;:;tioned the validity of the ~ta.te
court's eonclu~ion that under the federal ~tu.tute no constitutional tunendment was required. Our summary dismissal are, of course, to be taken
as rulings on the merits, Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U. S. 332, 343-845, in the
sense tha.t they r('jected the "specific challenges pr!:'~ented in the statements
of juri:odiction" and left "t\i1disturbed the judgment appealed f;rom.' 1
Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 1'76. They do not, however, have the
same nrecedential value here as does an opinion of this Court after briefing
and oral argument on the mt>rits, Edelmwi v. Jordan. 415 U. S. 651,
670-671; Richardson v. Rainirez. 418 U. S. 24, 58. A smnmary dismissal
of an appeal represents no more than a view that the judgment appealed
from W&:l eorrect. as to those federal quPstions rajsed and necessary to the
decision. It does not, as we ha.ve continued to stre:;s, see, e. g., Mandel v.
Bradley, supra, nece>~sarily reflect our agreement with the opinion of the
Court whose judgmPnt, is appealed. It is not at all unusual for the
Comi. f'o find it. appropriate to give full consideration to a que,.,;tion that
has been the ::;ubject of previous summary action. Massachu:.setts Bd.
Retirement v. M·urgia, 427 U. S. 307, 309 n. 1; Usery v. T·urner Elkhom
Mining Co ., 42R U. S. 1, 14. We do so in this case. The question that
W&:~hington asks us to avoid or to resolve· on the basis of stare decisis ha<~
ne\'ler received full plenary attention here. It. has been the subject of
exten~Jve briefing and argument by the part.ie::;. It has prov~ked several,
somewhat uncertain, opinions from the Washington courts, seen. 26, infra,
whose ultimate judgments were the subjects of summary di::;missa.ls here.
Fmally, it is an issue upon which the Executive Branch of the 1.Tnited
Stkttes Government. hM recently dm.nged its position diamet.rie<tlly as;
'explained in its amicus· brief and ora.I argudtent in this case.

On
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III
\Ve first address the contention that Washington was required to amend its constitution before it could validly
legislate under the authority of Pub. L. ·280. If the Tribe is
correct, we need not co11sider· the statutor·y and constitutional
questions raised by the system of partial jurisdiction established in Chapter 36. The Tribe. supported by the United
States as amicus curiae,~~ argues that a requirement for popular amendatory action is to he found in the express terms of
~ 6 of Pub. L. 280 or. if not there, in the terms of the
Enabling Act that admitted \Yashington to the rnion. 22 The
argument can best bt- understood in the context of the specific
statutory provisions involved.

A
The Enabling Act under which Wa.Shington, along with the
~~The United Stat<>R lw..« full~· briefed the ronstitutionaJ arntwlment
question and the qu<·~tion w1wtlwr parti,d 'jmi:-<diet.ion i;.; authorized by
Pub. L. 280. Its position on tlw rqual protertion holding of the Court of
Appeal:; j,.: Pquivoeal.
22 The Tribe abo rontl'nds that under its 1855 Trt>at~· with the United
Stitu•,.;, 12 Stat. 951, it was guurantr>rd a right. of :;~.•lf-gowrnmt>llt that wax
not cxpre~sly abrogated b~· Pub. ·L. 280. The argument assume~ that·
·under our ea~>', sr<•, e. g., Mmuminee T1·ibe v. United State3, ;{~)1 U. S.
404, trt>at~· right~ are pre,;erved unlr;-;~ Congres.s has shown a ~[)t'Cific intent
to abrognte them. Although we have ,.;tated that the intention to abrogate
or modify a treat~· i:> not to bo lightly imputed, Menominee 1'1ibe v.

United States. supra, at 413; Pigl'on Rivn f'o. v. Cox

ro .. 291

U. S. 138,

160, thl~ rule of eonstruction mu~t bf' applied sen~·ibly. In thiH context,
the argument made b~· the Tribe is tendentious. The treat~· right a~erted
by tlw Tribe i~ jurisdietional. So al~o is t11e '1'ntire subjPet-mattt>r of
'Pub. L. 21:!0. To neeept the Tribe';; po>'ition would br to hold that
Congress could not pas:> ·~ juri~rlidional law of griwntl applicability to
'lncliau ro1mtr~· unlr~,; in so domg it itt>mized all potentiall~· eonfiicting
"trmty right:> that. it wished to affPrt. This we declinr to clo. Thr intent
to a.hrogate incon,;iHtent trt>aty right" is elrar enough from the t-xpres~:>
termH of Pub. L . 2M. The Tril)(•'s argumrni on this j)Qint warraJH8 no
'further lli;;cusewn.
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States of Mo11tana, North Dakota, South Dakota. and Montana gained entry into the Union, was passed in 1889. Act of
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180. 2 '! Section 4 of that Act required the
constitutional conventions of the prospective new States to
23

Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, S. 4, 25 Stat. 676. The act pro ideH:
Wu~hington and Other States (25
St<t t. 6,7 6), Section 4
"Be it eru.u:tecl by the Senate and Home of Representatives vf the
United States of America in Congri!S8 assembeld, That the inhabitantl:i of
all that part of the a,rea of the Unit('d State;; now constituting the Territories of Dakota, Montana, and Washington, a:; at present det:erilwd, ma.y
becomfl the Statet; of North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and
WUl:ihington, respectively, a:s hereinafter provided .

"1. Enabling Act for the Admi:ssion of

"SBC. 4. That the delegates to the conventiOns elertt-d a;; prov1ded for
in thi;; net. shall meet at the S('Ht of government of each of said Territones . . . a.fter organization, shall declare, on bt>half of the people of
said proposed Stat~><>, that th<'y ndopt the Constitution of the United
States ; whereupon the said convent.ions shall bt>, and are hereby, authorized to form constitutions ana StateH govermnf'nt;; for said proposed
States, resJWrtivf'ly. Tf1e con~titutions shall be republiran in form, a.ncf
makP no distinction in civil or political right.s on account. of r!Wc or color,
exc!'pt a:; to Indium; not taxPd, and not bt> repugnant to thf' Constitution
of th<~ United States and thf' principlPs of th<' Declaration of IndependencP. And smd convPntions shall providP, by ordinances irrevocable·
wit.hout the consent of the Unitf'd States and the pPopfe of said Statps:·
" Second. That the ptople inhnbitmg ;;aid proposed Statf's do agr<'t' and'
declare that thPy forevPr di:;claim all right and titlf' to thf' unappropriated'
public land,; lying within the boundarif'~ thPreof, and to all laud-, lying
within ;;aid limits owned or held by u.ny Indian or Indian tribes; and that
·until the title thereto shall have been extinguished by the Unitf'd Sta.tes,
the samP sha.ll be and remain subject to the disposition of the l lnited
Statf'~, <Uld said Indian lands :shall rpmain under the absolutf' jurisdiction
uud <"ont rol of the Congress of the l:rnitrd Sta.tP~ : ... "
Uther admitting Act;; reqUiring a disclaimer of authority ovf't' Indian
lands are Mt of .July 16, 1894, eh . 138, 28 Stat. 107 (Utah); Ac-t of
June Hi, 1906, eh. 3335, 34 Stat. 2fii (Oklahoma); Act of June 20, 1910,
ch . 310, :36 Stat. 557 (Arizona and Kew :\IPxico) . The language of these
A.cts is vu'tually the ;;ame as than of 25 Stat. 671\i..

...
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enact provisions by which the people disclaimed title to lands
owued by Indians or Indian tribes and acknowledged that
those lands were to remain "under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of" Congress until the Indian or United States
title had been extinguished. Id., ch. 180. The disclaimers
were to be made "by ordinances irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of the States."
Ibid. Washington's constitutional convention ena.cted the
disclai~ner of authority over Indian lands as part of Art.
XXVI ' of the state constitution. 24 That Article, captioned
"Compact with the United States," is prefaced with the
statement-precisely tracking the language of the admitting
Wa:;h. Con:;t. Art. XXVI, n. 2. Art. XXVI reads as follows :
"COMPACT WITH THE UNITED STATES
"The following ordinance shall be irrf>vorable witJwut the cousent of the·
United State:; and t.he people of this :-;tate:24

"Second. Tha.t. the ·people inha.bjt.ing thi:;; stat·e do agref> and declare
that they forever di~:~claim an right a:ntl title to the unappropria.trd publie
lands lying within the l)otmdarie;; of this st<tte, and to all landR lyingwithin said limits owned or held by a.n~· Indian or Indian tribl:':'>; and that
until the titll:' thereto shall have been extit1guishl:'d by the United States,
the :same :;hall be and remain subjl:'ct, to the di:sposition of tlw United
Stat•e::~, and said Indian lands ~:~hall remain under the absolute jurisdiction
and control of the congre;s of the U11ited States and tha.t the lands
belonging to citizens of the United States residing withont the limits of
this ~:~h1te shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the lands belonging to
rPsidents thi:'I'eof; and that no taxes shall be imposed by the state on lands
or property therein, belonging to or which may be hereafter purchased by
the 1Jnited States or reserved for use: Provided, That nothing in this
ordinance shall preclude the sta,te from taxing as other lands are ta.xl:'d any
·lands owned or he)d by an Indian who has ::;evered his •tribal relations, and
ha.:; obtah1ed from the United Statl:'s or from any person a title thereto by
])l1tl:'nt or other grant, save and except such lands as have been or ma.y be
grantf>d to an~· Indian or Indians under any act of eongres:s conta.ining a
vrovision exempting the lands thus grantl:'d from taxation, which excPption
-shall eontinue so long and to ::;uch an extent as such act of congre&':i may
prescribe."

...
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statute-that "the following ordinance shall be irrevocable
without the consent of the United States and the people of
the State of Washington." Its substantive terms mirror the
language used in the enabling legislation.
We have already noted that two distinct provisions of Pub.
L. 280 are potentially applicable to States not granted an
immediate cession of jurisdiction. The first, § 6, without question applies to Washington and the seven other States admitted
into the Union under enabling legislation requiring organic
law disclaimers similar to that .i ust described. This much is
clear from the legislative history of Pub. L. 280, 25 as well as
from the express language of § 6. That section provides
"Notwithstanding the provisions of any Enabling Act
for the admission of a State, the consent of the United
States is hereby given to the people of any State to
amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove auy legal
impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become
effective with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction
by auy such State until the people thereof have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as
the case may be."
All other States were, as we have noted. covered by § 7. In
that section Congress gave the consent of the United States
"to any other State ... to assume jurisdiction at such
time and in such manner as the people of the State shallr
See H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Con g., 1st Sess. ( 1953). According to
thif-l n'port. ttccompanying H. R. 1053 (the House wrsion of Pub. L. 280)
t'exnminatwu of the Federal statutes and State constitutions has revealed
that. t.Jw enabling act~ for eight States, and in con:sequence the con~:;titu
tion:s of those States, contain express di:sclaimers of jurisdiction. Included
are Arizon~t, .Montmw., New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, and Washington." !d., at 6.
25

'
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by affirmative legislative action, obligftte and bind the
State to the assumption thereof."
These provisions appear to establish different modes of
procedure by which an option State, depending on which
flection applies to it, is to accept the Pub. L. 280 jurisdictional
offer. The procedure specified in § 7 is straightforward: affirmative legislative action by which the State obligates and
binds itself to assume jurisdiction. Section 6, in contrast, is
delphic. · The only procedure mentioned is action by the
people "to amend their constitutions or statutes, as the case
may be" to remove any legal impediments to the assumption
of jurisdiction. The phrase "where necessary" in the main
· clause suggests that a requirement for popular-as opposed to
legislative-action must be found if at all in some source of
law independent of Pub. L. 280. The proviso, however, has
a different import.
B
The proper construction to be given to the single inartful
8entence in § 6 has provoked chapters of argument from the
parties. The Tribe and the United States urge that notwithstanding the phrase "where necessary," § 6 should be construed to mandate constitutional amendment by disclaimer
States. It is their position tha.t § 6 operates not only to grant
the consent of the United States to state action inconsistent
with the terms of the enabling legislatio11 but also to establish
a distinct procedure to be followed by Enabling Act States.
To support their position, they rely on the language of the
proviso and upon certain legislative history of § 6. 2 G
In the alternative, the Tribe and the United States argue
that popular amendatory action, if not compelled by the terms
of ~ 6, is mandated by the terms of the Enabling Act of
Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4. Although they acknowledge that
· · '{~ongress in § 6 did grant the "consent of the United States~'
2H

See n . 35, 'ir1fm, and accompanying text,

..
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required under the Enabling Act before the State could remove
the disclaimer, they contend that § 6 did not eliminate the
need for the "consent of the people" specified in the Enabling
Act. In their view, the 1889 Act-if not Pub. L. 280-dictates
that constitutional amendment is the only valid procedure by
which that consent can be given.
The State draws an entirely different message from § 6.
It contends that the section must be construed in light of the
overall congressional purpose to facilitttte a transfer of juris·
diction to those option States willing to accept the responsibility. Section 6 was designed, it says, not to establish but to
remove lega1 barriers to state action under the authority of
Pub. L. 280. The phrase "where necessary" in its view is
consistent with this purpose. It would construe the word
"appropriately" in the proviso to be synonymous with "wQel'e
necessary'·' and the entire section to mean that constitutional
amendment is required only if "necessary" as a matter of
state law. The Washington Supreme Court having found
that legisla.tive action is sufficient to grant the "consent of
the people" to removal of the disclaimer in Art. XXVI of the
state constitution, 27 the State argues that the procedural
27

The validity of Chapter 36 was first challenged in the federal courts

in Quinrwlt Tribe of Indians v. Gal.laghe1·. 368 F. 2d 648 (CA9 196{1). In
Quinault. the Court of Appeal~ for the Ninth Cirrnit. held that under § 6
and the Enabling Act the consent of the people to removal of the disclaimer need only be made in some manner "valid and binding under state
law." !d., at, 657. Relying on the Washington Supreme Court's holding
in State v. Pa·ul, 53 W. 2d 789 (1959), that legislative action would suffice,
it concluded that Washington's assumption of jurisdiction was valid.
When Chapter 36 was first challenged in the state courts, the Washington
Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in State v. Paul. See Ma.kdh
Indian Tribe v. State, 76 W. 2d 485, 457 P. 2d 590 (1969); 1'onasket v.
State. ~4 W. 2d 164, 525 P. 2d 217 (1974). See al:so n. 16, ~'Upra. In
M aka.h. the Comt. reasoned, as it 'had in Y:>auJ that the makers of the
Washington Constitution intended that for purposes of Art. XXVI "the
people would speak through the mouth of the legislature." 76 w. 2d,

at
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requirements of § 6 have been fully satisfied. It finds the
Enabling Act irrelevant since in its view § 6 effectively
repealed any federal law impediments in that Act to state
assertiou of jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280. 28

c
From our review of the statutory, legislative. and historical
materials cited by the parties, we are persuaded that Washington's assumption of jurisdiction by legislative action fully
complies with the requirements of § 6. Although we adhere
to the principle that the procedural requirements of Pub. L.
280 must be strictly followed, Kennerly v. District Court, 400
U.S. 423, 427; McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
124, 180, and to the general rule that ambiguities in legislation affecting retained tribal sovereignty are to be construed
in favor of the Indians, see, e. g., Bryan v. Itasca Cty., 426
U. S. 373, 392. those pnnciples will not stretch so far as to
permit us to find a federal l'equirement affecting the mauner
in which the States. are to modify their organic legislation on
the basis of materials t11at are essentially speculative. Cf.
Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U. S. 343, 350-351.
The lauguage of ~ - 6, its · legislative history, and its role in.
Pub. L. 280 all clearly point the other way.
·we turn first to the language of § 6. -·T he main clause is
490. In additwn, it relied on Quinault for the propo,-ition that under § ~
the con~tifutional disclaimer nefd be removt>d only by a mPthod binding
under state law. In · 'l'onasket, the Wa,;hington court rea.ffirmPcl this
rea,;;oning. It. also relied on the altPmaLe ground that the disclajmer in
Art. XXVI could be con:;trucd not to pl'C'clude "criminal and civil rPgula.tion" on India.n lands and therefore would not, st.and as a ba.rricr to state
jHrisdJCtion. 84 W. 2d, at. '177.
2
~ The State m;sert;-; as well that flw Wn~hington conRtitutional di"rlaimcr doe~ not, po~ any Rubf'tantive barrier to state a,<;:sumption of
juru;dichon over ft>l' and unre:;tricted lands within the reservation. In
l1ght of our holding that Washmgton hilS f<atisfied the procedural requirements for n•pealing the disclaimN, we need not com;idcr the scope of thjs
:;tate eonsti tutionaJ provu:nou.
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framed in permissive, not mandatory terms. Had the drafters.
intended by that clause to mandate popula.r amendatory
action, it is unlikely that they would have included the words
"where necessary." As written, the clause suggests that the
substantive requirement for constitutional amendment must
be found i11 some source of law independent of § 6. The basic
question , then, is whether that requirement can be found in
the 1anguage of the proviso to § 6 or alternatively in the terms
of the Enabling Act.
We are unable to find the procedur·al mandate missing from
the main clause of § 6 in the language of the proviso. That
language in the abstract could be read to suggest that constitutional amendment is a condition precedent to a valid
assumption of jurisdiction by disclaimer States. Wheu examined in its context, however, it cannot fairly be read to impose
such a condition. Two considerations prevent this reading.
First, it is doubtfuf that Congress-in order to compel disclaimer States to amend their constitutions by popul~tr votewould have done so in a provision the first clause of which
consents to that procedure "where necessary" and the proviso
to which indicates that the procedure is to be followed if
"appropriate." Second, the reference to popular amendatory
action in the proviso is not framed as a cj.escription of the
procedure the States must follow to assume jurisdiction. but
instead is written as a condition to the effectiveness of "the
provisious of" Pub. L. 280. When it is recalled that the only
substantive provisions of the Act-other than those arguably
to be found in § 7-accomplish an immediate transfer of jurisdiction to specifically named States, it seems most likely that
the proviso was included to ensure that § 6 would not be construed to effect an immediate transfer to the disclaimer group
of option States. The maiu clause removes a federal law barrier to any new state jurisdiction over Indian country. The
proviso suggests that disclaimer States are not automatically
· to ree-eive .vunisdiction by vittl.l.C' mf' .11hat removaL Withooit
t
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the proviso, in the event that state constitutional amendment were not found "necessary," 20 § 6 could be construed as effecting an immediate cession. Congress clearly
wanted all the option States to "obligate and bind" themselves to assume the jurisdiction offered in Pub. L. 280."0 To
be sure, constitutional amendment was referred to as the
process by which this might be accomplished in disclaimer
States. But, given the distinction that Congress clearly drew
between those States and automatic transfer States, this reference call hardly be construed to mandate that process.
Before turning to the legislative history, which, as we shall
29 Dif;claimer States have responded in diverse ways to the Pub. L. 280
offer of Jurisdiction. See Goldberg, Pub. L. 280: The Limits of State
Jurisdiction ' over Reservation Indian~, 22 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 535, 546548, 567-575. Only one-North Dakota-has amended its constitution.
30 In Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U. S. 423, we emphao;ized the need
for the responsible jurisdictions to "manife~t by political action [their]
willingne~s and ability to discharge their new responsibilitjeo;." ld., at 427.
Kennerl-y involved an attempt by the state courts of Montana to a~~ert
civil jurisdiction over a transaction that occurred within reservation boundaries. The tribe had requested :state juri:sdiction, but the Stat,e had not
obligated ito~elf to a:s:sum it. The ca~e was litigated on the theory that § 7
obligated itself to assume it. The raHe wa~ litigated on the theory that § 7
requirement of "a-ffirmative legislative action." Ibid. Two of our other
cases involving Pub. L. 280 al:so illu~trate the need for respon~ible action
under the federal :statute. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, we held that
the State of Arizona-one of the disclaimt>r States-could not validly exercise juri~diction over a civil action brought by a non-Indian against an
Indian for a transaction that occurred on the N a.v aho Re:servation. We
relied on the traditional principle that a State may not infringe the right
of re~ervation Indian~ "to make their own law~ and be ruled by them"
without an express authorization by Congress. Id., at 220. In Williams,
the State had not atempted to comply with§ 6: the state court had taken
jurisdiction without state statutory or con~titutional authorization. A
sirmlar ~Jtuation obtained in McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
Hi4 (1973). There we held that Arizona could not by simple legislative
enactmt>nt tax incomf' earned by a Navaho from reservation source~. The
tax statntt> at. is;;ue was not framed as a measure obligating the State to.
tt.SSUme responsibilit~· under Pub. L, 280,
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see, accords with this interpretation of § 6, we address the
argument that popular amendatory action, if not a requirement of Pub. L. 280, is mandated by the legislation admitting
Washington to the Union. This argument requires that two
assumptions be made. The first is that § 6 eli:rninated some
but preserved other Enabling Act barriers to a State's assertion of jurisdiction over Indian country. The second is that
the phrase "where necessary" in the main clause of § 6 was
intended to refer to those federal law barriers that had been
preserved. Only if ea,ch of these premises is accepted does
the Enabling Act have any possible application.
Since we find the first premise impossible to accept, we
proceed no further. Admitting legislation is, to be sure, the
only source of law mentioned in the main clause of § 6 and
might therefore be looked to as a referent for the phrase
"where necessary" in the clause. This reading, however, is
not tenable. It supplies no satisfactory answer to the question why Congress-in order to give the consent of the United
States to the removal of state organic law disclaimers-would
not also have by necessary implication coqsented to· the
removal of any procedural constraints on the States imposed
by the Enabling Acts. The phrase "notwithstanding the
terms of any Enabling Act" in § 6 is broad-broad enough to
suggest that Congress when it referred to a possible necessity
for state constitutional amendment did not intend thereby to
perpetuate any such requirement in an Enabling Act.. Even
assuming that the phrase "consent of the people" in the
Enabling Act must be construed to preclude consept by legislative action-and' the Tribe and the United States have o£fered no concrete authority to support this restrictive reading
of the phrase-:Jl we think it obvious that in the "notwith,,

There is, for example, nothing in the legi~laJ.ive history of the
Enabling Act to indicate that the "con~ent of the people" could be given
only by a proce~s of constitutional amendment. The scant legi~lative
1·ecord of the Enabling Act is devoted to a debate over the wisdom ol
31
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standing" clause of § 6 Congress me~jtnt to remove any federal
impediments to state jurisdiction that may have bee11 created
by all Enabling Act.
The legislative history of Pub. L. 280 supports the conclusion that § 6 did not of its own force establish a state constitutional amendment requirement a~1d did not preserve any
such requirement that might be found in an Enabling Act.
Pub. L. 280 was the first jurisdictional bill of general applicability ever to be enacted by Congress. It reflected congressional concern over law and order problems on Indian
reservations and the financia1 burdens of continued federal
jurisdictional responsibilities on Indian lands, Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U. S. 373. It was also, however·, without question reflective of the general assimilationist policy followed
by Congress from the early 1950's through the late 1960's~ 32
splitting the Dakota territory into lwo States and of admitting both immedialt>ly to the Unjon . In none of thr,;e debatr::; was there any extended
discu::;sion of tlw Indian land disclaimer or any indication that the "con~
sent. of the pt>ople" to removal of thr di;.;claimt>r could not be given by the
people 's representatiws in t11e lrgblature. See Adver:sp Reports of the
House Committee on the Territorit>:s, May 1886 and Feb. 1888, annt>xed to
H . R. Rep . No. 1025, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 19-25 (1888). See abo, e. g.,
19 Cong. Rec. 2804, 2883, 3001, ·:m7 (1888); 20 Cong. Rec. 801, 869
(1889) . The only explicit references to tlw dh;elaimer of authority over
Indian lands are found in H. R : Rep. No. 1025, s'Upra, at 8-9 (calling
att>ntion to fact that by the terms of the bill largt> Indian Reservations in
the Dakota Territory "remain within the exclusive control and jurisdiction
of tlw United States) and in 19 Cong. Rcc. 2832 (1888) (Oklahoma Delegate objecting to the disclaimer) .
at That policy was formally announced in H. R. Con . Res. 108, 67 Stat.
B132, approved on July 27, 1953, the s111ne ·clay that Pub. L. 280 was
passrd by tht> Hou~t> . 99 Cong. Rec. 9968, 83d Coug., 1st Sr~s. (195a).
A~ statffi in H. R. Con. Res. 108, the policy of Congres::; was "as rapidly
a;; possible, to make the Indians within the territorial limit:; of the United
State~ subject to the same laws and entitlt>d to the same privileges and
responsibilities as are applicable to othet· citizens of the United States, to
end the1r status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of
the rightH and prerogatives pertaining to Amedcan citizenship . . . . !'

..
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See H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). See also
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the
Interior & Insular Affairs Committee on H. R. 459, H. R.
3235, and H. R. 3624, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). The failure
of Congress to write a tribal consent provision into the transfer provision applicable to option States as well as its failure
to consult with the tribes during the final deliberations on
Pub. L. 280 provide ample evidence of this.aa
This policy reflt>cted a return to 1he philmsophy of the General Allotment
Act of 1187, ch. 119, S. 1, 24 Stat. 288, as amended 25 U. S. C. § 331
(1970) , popularly known as the Dawes Act, a philosophy which had been
rejected with the passage of the Indian lleorganization Act of 19:H, 48
Stat. 984
In Bryan v. Itasca Coutl,ty, 42() U. S. 373, the Court emphasized tha.t
Pub. L . 280 was not a termination measure and should not be constrm>cl
as such . Our discussion here is not to Uw contrary. Tlw parties agree
that Pub. L. 280 reflected an assirnilationist philosophy. That Congress
intended to facilihLt'e nssimilation when it authorized a tran~fer of .iurisdiction from the Federal Government to the States does not necesf<!trily mean,
bowever, that it intended in Pub. L. 280 to terminate tribal self-government. lndeed, it may be that even after the transfer tribal courts retain
roncurrent jurisdictiOn in areas in which they formerly shared jurisdiction
with the Federal Goverument. 'The Tribe has urged that we so hold.
This issue, however, is not wit11in tlw seope of our order noting probable
juri::;diction, Het> n. 20, supra, and we do not ciPcide. it here.
33 The;;e ft>ature::; of Pub. L. 280 have attracted extensive criticism.
See
generally Goldberg, 8Upra, n. 29. Indeed, the experience of the Yakima
Nation i~ in itself sufficient to demonstrate why the Act has provoked S<f
murh rritiCJsm. In 1952, in connection with the introduction of bills that
proposPd a general jurisdictional transfer, RPe Hearings before the Subcommittee ou Indian Affairs of the IntPrior & Insular Affairs CommittPe on
H. R. 459, H. R a235, and H. R. 3624, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952) (heremafter 1952 Hearings), a repre::seutat ive of thP Yakimas testified that the
Tribe was oppo~ed to the exten,;ion of state jurisdictiou on the Yakima
He•P rvatJOn. He Rtatcd :
"The Yakima lndinus ... feel that in the State Courts they will not. be·
I rc·atPd as well as thPy are in the FPciPral courts, becausp the:; believe that
many of the citizens of the State arr still prPjudiced against tlw Indians.
"They are now .tmder the .Federal laws amc[ have their own trify.l] Jawsr,.
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Indeed, the circumstances surroundiHg the passage of Pub.
L. 280 in themselves fully qear out the State's general thesis
that Pub. L. 280 .was intended to facilitate, not to impede,
the trausfer of jurisdictional ·responsibility to the States.
Pub. L. 280 originated in a series of individual bills introduced in the 83d Congress to transfer jurisdiction to the five
willing States who eventuaily were Covered in §§ 1 and 4.'14
H. R Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). 'Those bills
were consolidated into H. R. 1063. which was referred to the
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Committee
for consideration. Closed hearings on the bill~ were held before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs on June 29 and
July 15, 1953.H 5 During the opening session on June 29,
customs, and regulations. This system is working well and the Yakima
Tribe believes that it should be continued and not changed at this time:"
1952 Hearings, at 84-85.
In 195:3, when the Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the Hou~e Committee
on Indian Affairs considered the final version of Pub. L. 280, the Committee was again aware that the Yakima Nation oppo~;ed state jurisdiction.
The House He port accompanying H. H. 1063 containl:l a lPtter from the
Department of the Interior listing the Tribe as among tho;;!" oppo;;ed to
· ''b=ing ::;ubjected to State jurisdiction" and having ll "tribal law-and-o1·der
organization that functions .in a rea;;onably sa.tisfactory manner." H. R.
848, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1953). Had Washington been included among
thE' mandatory States, it is thus quite possible that the Yakima Re~erva
tion would have been excepted.
34 Similar bills had been introduced in the 82d Congress, and in public
hearing~:~ held on those the idea of a. general trau:;fer was di:;cu,;sed at
length. See 1952 Hearings, supra, n. :31.
Hn See Unpublished Transcript of Hearings 6'11 H. R. 1063 before the Snb~
committee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on Interior & Insula;r
Affairs on June 29 and July 15, 1953 (hereinafter cited as .June 29 Hearmgs, and July 15 Hearings.) The transcript of these hearings was firllt
made available to this Comt by the United Statell during the briefing of
Tonasket v. Washington, 411 U.S. 451. It was again supplied in B1·yan v.
Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373, and for thi~:> appeal ha,; been reproduced in
full 111 the Appellee',; Appendix. Thelle hearing~:>, along with the House
Report on H. R. 1063 a~:> amended, H . R . Rep~ No. S48, 8:3d Cong., I,;t
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Committee Members, counsel, and representatives of the Department of the Interior discussed various proposal designed
to give H. R. 1063 general applicability. June 29 Hearings
1-16.. It rapidly became clear that the Members favored a
general bill. Ibid. At this point, Committee counsel noted
that several States "have constitutional prohibit~ons aga.i nst
jurisdiction." !d., at 17. There followed some qiscussion of
the manner in which these States should be treated. On
July 16, a version of ~ 6 was proposed. July l5 Hea.rings
23. After further discussion of the disclaimer problem, the
"notwithstanding" clause w~s added, id., at 27, and the language eventually enacted as ~ 6 was approved by the Committee that day. The speed and the context alone suggest
that § 6 was designed to remove an obstacle to state jurisdiction, not to create one. And the discussion at the hea.rings,
which in essence were mark-up sessions, makes this clear.
On July 15, committee counsel presented a.n amendment
which was eventually to become § 6. He explained th~ effect
of the amendment as follows :
"[T] he legislation as acted upon by the committee would
apply to only five states. The two additional section
amendments would apply first to eight states having constitutional or organic law impediments and w,ould grant
the consent of the United States for them to remove such
impediments and thus to acquire jurisdiction.
"The other amendment would apply to any other
Indian states ... who would acquire jurisdiction at such
time as the legislative body affirmatively indicated their
desire to so assume jurisdiction." July 15 Hea.rings,
at 24.
ImmPdiately after the proposed § 6 was read to the subcomrnittee, the Chairman, Congressman D'Ewart, commented:

,,

SP~8 .

(1053) and the Senate RPport, which is virtually identical, S. Rep.
No. 699, 83d Cong. , hit Se.s;;. (1953) , constitute the primary lcgi:slative
materials on Pub. L. 280.
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"I do not think we have to grant permission to a state
to amend its own statutes. Id., at 25.
Committee counsel replied:
"Mr. D'Ewart, I believe the reason for this is that in
some instances it is spelled out both in the constitution
and the statutory provisions as a result of the Act and it
may be unnecessary, but by some state courts it may be
interpreted as being necessary." !d., at 26.
The version of § 6 read to the Committee members by
counsel contained no reference to the Enabling Acts but
merely granted consent for the States to remove existing
impediments to the assertion of jurisdiction over Indians. It
was suggested that in order effectively to authorize the States
to modify their organic legislation the clause should be more
specific. 'This suggestion resulted in the proposal of the
"notwithstanding" clause. 'The following exchange then took
place :
" [C'ommittl'!e counsel]: I believe that the clause "notwithstanding any provisions of the Enabling Act" fol'
such states might well be inCluded. It would make clear
that Congress was repealing the -:Enabling Act.
" [Congressman Dawson] -: -to give permission to amend
their constitutions.
" I Committee counsel]: I think that would help clarify
the intent of the committee at the present time and of
Congress if they favorably acted on the legislation." Id.,
at 27.
The next day, July 16, the Committee filed its report on the
substitute bill. H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
·(1953) . 'The report explains that§ 6 would
"give consent of the United States to those States presently having organic laws expressly disclaiming jurisdic-
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tion to acquire jurisdiction subsequent to enactment by
amending or repealing such disclaimer laws." us
The Committee hearings thus make clear an intention to
remove any feder_al barrie~~ to the assumption of jurisdiction
by Enabling Act States. They also make clear that that consent was not to effect an immediate transfer of jurisdiction.
While some Committee members apparently thought that§ 6
States, as a matter of state law, would have to amend their
constitutions iu order to remove the disclaimers found there, 37
there is no indication that the Committee intended to impose
any such requirement.
We conclude that § 6 of Pub. L. 280 does not require disclaimer States to amend their constitutions to make an
effective acceptance of jurisdiction. We also conclude that
any Enabling Actrequirement of this nature was effectively
repealed by § 6. If a~ a matter of state law a constitutional
amendment is required, that procedure must--as a inatter of
state law-be foiiowed. And if under state law a constitutional amendment is not required, disclaimer States must still
take positive action before :Pu·~. L. 280 jurisdiction can become
effective. The Washington Supreme Court having determined that for purposes of the repeal of Art. XXVI of the
Washington Constitution legislative action is sufficient,as and'
appropriate state legislation having been enacted, it follows
ao ThP Housp pas,;ed the bill without dPbate on ,luly 27, 195:3. 99· Cong.
Rec. 9962-9963 (1953). In thr Senat(', the bill was refrrrNI to the CommJttep on Intf'rior and In,;ular Affair~. 99 Cong. Rrc. 10065 (1953).
That CommittPe held no hearings of it~ own, and it r('port('d out thr bill
two days later without amendment. 99 Cong. Rec. 10217 (195:3). The·
bill received only brief consideration on the SenatP floor beforP it wa:;
passed on August 1, 1953. 99 Cong. Rec. 10783-10784 (1953).
37 SrP .June 29 Hearings at 17; .July 15 Hearings, at 24-28 .
.~~The Tribe has intimated that the Washington Supreme Court 'R holding is incorrect. 'How('ver, thP procPdnre by which tlw disclaimer might
be rPmoved or repealed-Congress having :pven its con::;ent,.-is is we I1aviit
held a question uf state Jaw.
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that the State of Washington has satisfied the procedural
requirements of § 6.

IV
We turn to the question whether the State was authorized
under Pub. L. 280 to assume only partial subject-matter and
geographic jurisdiction over I1~dian reservations within the
State. 39
The argument that P\lh. L. 280. does not permit this scheme
of partial j uri.sdiction relies primarily upon the text of the·
federal law. The main contention of the · Tribe and the
United States is that partial jurisdiction, because not specifically auth_orized, must therefore be forbidden. In addition,
they assert that the interplay between the provisions of
Pub. L. 280 demonstrates that ~ 6 States are required. if they
assume ltny jurisdiction, to assume as much jurisdiction as was
transferred to the mandatory States. 40 Pointing out that 18
au Bbth parties find support for thPii' po~itions on this issue in the legislativP h~ory of the arnendmE>nt~ to Pub. L. 280 in Title IV of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 73. The 1968 legislation provides that
States that have not extendE-d criminal or civil }urisdiction to Indian
cotthtry ran makr future extem;ions on!~· with the consent of the tribes
affected. 25 U. S. C. §§ 1321 (a). 1322 (a.) . The amendments also provide explicitly for partial assemption of jurisdiction. Ibid . In addition,
they authorizE' tlw United StatE'S to accPpt retroce~:~sions of jurisdiction,
full or partial, from thE' mandatory and the § 7 States. 25 U. S. C.
§ 1323 (a) . Section 7 itsE'If was rPpealed with t.he provil:lo that the repeal
was not intE>nded to affE>ct any ce:;~ion made prior to the repeal. 25
U. S. C. § 1323 (b). Section 6 was re-enacted without change. 25
§ 1324.
We do not rely on the 1968 legisla.tion or its history, finding tlw latter
equivocal, and mindful that the issues in t,hi8 case are to be determine-d
in accord with legislation enacted by CongrE'~S in 1953.
"10 Since Pntire reservations were exempted from coverage in three of the
man<l:tt ory Statf'l:i, thP Tribe and the United States concPde that the option
States could probably a::>~:~ume juri::>diction on a re~:~ervation-by-reservation
basis. The UnitE'd StatE'S a]:-;o conredP~ that the word "or" in § 7 might
be construed to mean that optio11 States need 1wt extend both civil and
'ICtiminal jurisdictioJL.
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U. S. C. § 1151 defines Indian count1'Y for purposes of federal
jurisdiction as including an entire reservation notwithstanding
"the issuance of any fee patent," they reason that when Congress in § 2 transferred to the mandatory States "criminal
jurisdiction" over "offenses committed by or against Indians
in Indian country," it meant that all parts of Indian country
were to be covered. Similarly, they emphasize that civil jurisdiction of comparable scope was transferred to the mandatory
States. They stress that in both ~§ 2 and 4, the consequence
of state assumption of jurisdiction is that the state "crimina1
laws'' and "civil laws of general application" ftre henceforth
to "have the same force and effect within . .. Indian country
as they have elsewhere in the State." Finally. the Tribe aJJd
the United States contend that the congressional purposes of
eliminating the jurisdictional hiatus thought to exist on Indian
reservations, of reducing the cost of the federal responsibility
for jurisdiction on 'tribal lands, and of assimilating the Indian
tribes into the general state popula.tion are disserved by the
type of checkerboard arrangement permitted by Chapter 36.
We agree, however, with the State of Washington that
statutory authorization for the state jurisdictional arrangement is to be found in the very words of ~ 7. That provision
permits option States to assume jurisdiction "in such manner"
as the people of the State shall "by affirmative legislative
action, obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof."
Once the requirements of § 6 have been satisfied, the terms or
§ 7 provide the substantive scope of jurisdiction permitted to
disclaimer States. The phrase "in such manner" in ~ 7 means
at least that any option State can condition the a.ssumption
of full jurisdiction on the consent of an affected tribe. A1id
here Washington has done no more than refraiu from exercising the full measure of allowable jurisdiction witqout consent
of the tribe affected.
Section 6, as we have seen. was placed in the Act to eliminate possible organic law barriers to the assumption of
· jurisdiction by disclaimer .States. · 'T he Tribe and the United
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States ackllowledge that it is a procedural not a substantive
section. The elause contains only one reference of relevance
to the ()artial jurisdiction question. '·This is the phrase "as~
sumption of civil or criminal jurisdiction in accordance with
the provisions of this Act." . ·As both parties recognize, this
phrase necessarily leads to other "provisions" of the Act for
clarification of the substantive scope of the · jurisdictional
grant. The first questiou then is which other "provisions" of
the Act govern. The.second is what constraints those 1'provisions" place on the jurisdictional arrangements made by
option States.
The Tribe and the United States argue as an initial matter
that § 7 is not one of the "provisions" referred to by § 6.
They rely in pa.rt upon the contrast between the phrase
.Hassumption of civil and criminal jurisdicti01i" in § 6 and the
disjunctive phrase 1'crimina1 offenses or civil causes of action"
in § 7. From this distinction betweewthe "civil and criminal
jurisdiction" language of ~ 6 and the optional language in § 7,
we are asked to conclude that § 6 'States must assume full
jurisdiction in accord with the terms applicable to the mandatory States even though § 7 States are permitted mot"e
discretion. We are unable to accept 'this argument, not only
because the statutory language ·does not fairly support it, but
also because the legislative· history is wholly to the contrary.
It is clear from the Committee hearings that the States
covered by § 6 were, except for the possible impediments
contained in their organic laws, to be treated on precisely the
same terms as option States.'1 1
Section 6, as we have seen, was essentially an afterthought
designed to accomplish the limited purpose of r·emoving any
barrier to jurisdiction posed by state organic law disclaimers
of jurisdiction over Indians. All option States were originally
treated under the aegis of § 7. 42 · The record of the Committee
41

See .June 24 and July 15, supra, n . 35.
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heanngs makes clear that the sole purpose of § 6 was to
resolve the disclaimer problem. 13 Indeed, to the extent that.
the Tribe and the United States suggest that disclaimer States
st11nd on a difierent footing from all other option States, their
argument makes no sense. It would ascribe to Congress an
intent to require States that by force of organic law barriers
may have had only a limited involvement with Indian country
to establish the most intrusive presence possible on Indian
reservations, if any at all, and at the same time an intent to
allow Rtates with different traditions to exercise more restraint
in extending the coverage of their law.
The Tribe and the United States urge that even if, as we
have concluded, all option States are ultimately governed by
§ 7, the reference in that section to assumption of jurisdiction
"as provided for in the Act" should be construed to mean that
the automatic transfer provisions of §§ 2 and 4 must still
apply. The argument would require a conclusion that the
option States stand on the same footing as the mandatory
States. Their view is not persuasive. The mandatory States
were consulted prior to the introduction of the single-state
bills that were eventually to become Pub. L. 280. All had
indicated their willingness to accept whatever jurisdiction
Congress was prepared to transfer. This, however, was not
the case with the option States. Few of those States had
been consulted, and from the June 29 and July 15 hearings it
is apparent that the drafters were primarily concerned with
establishing a general transfer scheme that would facilitate,
not impede, future action by other States .willing to accept
jurisdiction. It is clear that the all-or-nothing approach suggested by the Tribe would impede even the most responsible
and sensitive jurisdictional arrangements designed by the
States. To find that under Pub. L. 280 a State could not
exercise partial jurisdiction, f'Ven if it were willing to extend
"H

&x•, e. g., July 15 He:1ring,~, ttl 24.
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full jurisdiction at tribal request, would be quite inconsistent
with this basic history. .
The language of §7, which we have found applicable here,
provides, we believe, surer guidance to the issue before us:H
The critical language in § 7 is the phrase permitting the
assumption of jurisdiction "at such time and in such manner
as the people of the State shall . . . obliga.te and bind the
State to the assumption thereof." Whether or not ('in such
manner" is fully synonymous with "to such extent," the
phrase is at least broad enough to authorize a State to condition the extension of full jurisdiction over an Indian reservation on the consent of the tribe affected.
The United Sta.tes argues that a construction of Pub. L. 280'
which permits selective extension of state jurisdiction allows
a State to "pick and choose" orily those subject-matter areas
and geographical parts of reservations over which it would
like to assume responsibility~ ·congress, we are told, passed
Pub. L. 280 not as a measure to ·benefit the States but to
reduce the economic buraens associated with federal jurisdiction on reservations, to respond to a perceived hiatus in law
enforcement protections avaihible to tribal Indians, ;and to
achieve a11 orderly assimilation of Indians into the general
population. That these were the major concerns underlying
the passage of Pub. L. 280 cannot be doubted. See n ·ryan v.
Itasca Cty., supra, 426 U.S., at 379.
But Chapter 36 does not reflect an a.ttempt to reap the
benefits and to avoid the burdens of the jurisdictional offer·
made by Congress. To the contrary, the State must assume
total jurisdiction whenever a tribal request is made that it
do so. Moreover, the partial geographic and subject-matter
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Tlw 1968 amendments, which re-enacted § 6 without change as 25
U. S. C. §1324 but repealed §7, 25 U.S. C. §132:~ (b), and added sub;;tnntive jurisdictional provision~ covering "any ~tate," see 25 U. S. C.
§§ 1321, 1322, sugget:~t that in the ft1tl\f!~ the, ScQJJe of jurisdiction for alL
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jurisdiction that exists in the absence of tribal consent is
responsive to the law enforcement concerns that underla.y the
adoption of Pub. L. 280. State jurisdiction is complete as to
all non-Indians on reservations and is also complete as to
Indians on nontrust lands. The law enforcement hiatus that
preoccupied th~ 83d Congress has to that extent been eliminated. On trust and restricted lands within the reservations
whose tribes have not requested the coverage of state law,
jurisdiction over crimes by Indians is, as it was when Pub. L.
280 was enacted, shared by the tribal and federal governments. To the extent that this shared federal and triba.I
responsibility is inadequate to preserve law and order, the
tribes need only request and they will receive the protection
of state law.
The State of Washington in 1963 could have unilaterally
extended full jurisdiction over crimes and civil causes of action
in the entire Yakima Reservation without violating the terms
of Pub. L. 280. We are unable to conclude th;:J..t the State, in
asserting a less intrusive presence on fhe Reservation while at
the same time obligating itself to assume full jurisdictional
responsibility upon request, somehow flouted the will of
Congress. A Sta.te that has accepted the jurisdictional offer
in Pub. L. 280 in a way that leaves substantial play for tribal
self-government, under a voluntary system of partial jurisdiction that reflects a responsible attempt to accommod~te the
needs of both Indians and non-Indians within a reservation,
has plainly taken action within the terms of the offer made
by Congress to the Sta.tes in 1953. For Congress surely did
not deny 1111 option Sta.te the power to condition its offer of
full jurisdiction on tribal consent.

v
Having concluded that Chapter 36 violates neither the procedural nor the substantive terms of Pub. L. 280, we turn,
finallyl to the question whether the "checkerboard" fattern
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of jurisdiction applicable op the reservations of nonoonsen.t-ing tribes is on its face invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmeut. 4 " The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit coucluded that it is, reasoning
that the land-title classification is too bizarre to meet "any
formulation of the rational basis test." 552 F. 2d, ~t 1135.
The Tribe advances several different. lines of ar~ument in
defense of this ruling.
First. it argues that the classifications implicit in Chapter
36 are racial classifications, "suspect" under the test en unciated in McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, and that they
cannot stand unless justified by a compelling state interest .
. Second, it argues that its interest in self-government is a
fundamental right, and that Chapter 36-as a law abridging
this right-is presumptively invalid. Finally, the Tribe
argues that Chapter 36 is in valid even if reviewed under the
more traditional equal protection criteria articulated in such
cases as Massa(;husetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307.'10
The Court of Appeals did not di~turb the finding of the District Court
that Chapter 36 had not been a.pplil'cl on the Yakima Heservation to discriminate again~t the Tribe or any of its members. The District Court
found that the governmental legal s<>rvire~ available to the Trib<> and its
membrrs were not sigiilficantly diffrrrnt from tho;;e offered to other rurul
and c1ty residents of Yakima County. It also concluded that the distinctions drawn between non-Indianr:. and Indians in the statute were not
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In view of these findingt>, our
inquiry hrre is limited to the narrow que;;tion whether the distinctions
drawn in Chapter 36 on their face violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
46 The Court of Appt>al~ limited itR holding to the land-tenurt> classifiea1ion. The Tribe, in support of the judgment, has argued that thE:' Chaptl•r :36 cla:ssificatiom; bas!:'d on llw tribal statu~ of the offeudpr and on
whPt hPr a juvenile IS involved arc abo facially invalid . In our view t hr~e
status classifications of Chapter :36, arc· indiHtingui~hablr from the interrelated land-tenlJ,rC classi.fir.ati0n S0l £ar as the Equal Protection Clau::;e js;
QQncerncd,

.·
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We agree wtih the Court of Appeals to the extent that its
opinion rejects the first two of these arguments and reflects
a judgment that Chapter 36 must be sustained a.gainst an
Equal Protection Clause attack if the classifications it employs
"rationally further the purpose identified by the State."
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307,
314. It is settled that "the unique legal status of Indian
tribes under federal law" permits the Federal Government to
enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that
might otherwise be constitutionally offensive. Morton v.
Mancari, 417 U. S. 535. 551- 552. States do not enjoy this
same unique relationship with Indians, but Chapter 36 is not
simply another state law. It was enacted iu response to a
federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation
of jurisdiction over Indians. The jurisdiction permitted under
Chapter 36 is, as we have found, within the scope of ~he
authorization of Pub. L. 280. And many of the classifications
made by Chapter 36 are also made by Pub. L. 280. ·Indeed,
classifications based on tribal status and laud tenure inhere
in many of the decisions of this Court involving jurisdictional
controversies between tribal Indians and the States, see, e. g.,
McBratney v. United States, supra. For these reasons, we
find the argument that such classifica.tions are "suspect" an
untenable one. The contention that Chapter 36 abridges a
"fundamental right" is also untenable. It is well-established
that Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian
affairs. may restrict the retained sovereign powers of the
Indian tribes. See, e. g., United States v. Wheeler, - U. S.
ln enacting Chapter 36, Washington was legislating
under explicit authority granted by Congress in the exercise
of that federal power. 47
The question that remains, then, is whether the lines drawn
41 This is not to hold that Pub. L. 280 was a lt>rmination mea~ure.
Whether there is concurrent tribal unci ::;tate .iunHdiction on ~:;ome are~t:> m·
t.he H.est>rvatioo is an llisue we ciD not cfeei'cfe:. Sel' n. :32:, Slhpra..
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by Chapter 36 fail to meet conventional Equal Protection
Clause criteria, as the Court of Appeals held. Under those
criteria, legislative classifications are valid unless they bear
no rational relationship to the State's objectives. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, supra, at 307. State
legislation "does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications [it makes] are imperfect."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 485. Under these
standards we have no difficulty in concluding that Chapter 36
does not offend the Equal Protection Clause.
The lines the State has drawn m'ay well be difficult to administRr. But they are no more or less so than many of the
classifications that pervade the law of Indian Jurisdiction.
See Seymour v. Superintendent, 386 U. S. 351; Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463. Chapter 36 is fairly calculated to further the State's interest in providing protection
to non-Indian citizens living within the boundaries of a reservation while at the same time allowing scope for tribal selfgovernment on trust or restricted lands. The land-tenure
classification made by the State is neither an irrational or
arbitrary means of identifying those areas within a reservatioJl in wihch tribal members have the greatest interest in
being free of state police power. Indeed, many of the rules
developed in this Court's decisions in cases acccommodating
the sovereign rights of the tribes with those of the States are
strikingly similar. See, e. y., Untied States v. M cBratney,
I!Jupra; Draper v. United States, supra; Williams v. Lee, supra,·
M cClan,ahan v. Arizona, supra. In short, checkerboard jurisdiction is not novel in Indian law, and does not, as such, violate the Constitution.
For the reasons set out in this opinion, the judgment of the
C'ourt of Appeals is reversed.
1t is so ordered.
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